


:: LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. I 



\ ^i^-o// .S-5>h^&. 



I UNITED STATES OF AMEKICA. | 



1 



THE REVIEW 



General Sherman's Memoirs 



EXA.MIlSrED, 



CHIEFLY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OWN EVIDENCE. 



C. W. MOULTON, 

CINCINNATI, O. 



,^T*r/ «' 



""^•Mv^^hm^*^ 



CINCINNATI : 

ROBERT CLARKE & CO., PRINTERS, 

1875. 



.S55S55 



;2- l&o^l 



PEEFACE. 



The preparation of this pamphlet has been undertaken 
and completed in such moments as could be spared from 
daily occupations in the courts. 

To fully discuss all the points raised in the review of 
Sherman's Memoirs, has not been attempted. To do this 
would necessitate full access to the records of the War 
Department, and more time than I can command. The 
only endeavor has been to show that the documents pub- 
lished in the Review are, almost alone, sufficient for the 
refutation of the graver charges against General Sherman. 

I have been materially aided in this matter by my friend, 
Florien Giauque, Esq., of this city. With this exception, 
no person but myself is responsible for the publication of 
this pamphlet. 

Cincinnati, 1875. 



With the Compliments of 

THE AUTHOR. 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

The examination of this work^ was undertaken with 
no little interest, because the promises of its author had led 
me to believe that he intended to correct the Memoirs l»y 
the light of the records which appear to have been so gen- 
erously opened to him. But the perusal of even a few of its 
pages must satisfy any impartial reader that its author writes 
in a spirit bitterly hostile to General Sherman ; and the 
examination of the entire work will convince him that not 
only do the records he cites often fail to sustain the propo- 
sitions they are intended to prove, but that frequently they 
contradict them. To show that either this frame of mind 
has warped this reviewer's judgment, or that he has delib- 
erately made false statements, and sought to ingeniously 
sustain thenii by an unfair presentation of records, is one 
of the objects of this pamphlet. It might, perhaps, be 
profitably borne in mind that even these records are the 
reports, orders, letters, etc., of persons who, no matter what 
their rank, were nevertheless fallible men, w\th more or less 
imperfect means for obtaining correct information, and that 
they would have been more than human had their produc- 
tions been always untinged by prejudice or by the desire 
to set forth their own acts in a favorable light before their 
superiors and the public. General Sherman was one of 
these men; but the iact.that he was a prominent one, and 
has written his recollections of men and events of the war, 
is no reason why he should be attacked in an unfair or 
hostile spirit. That General Sherman has been unjust or 
unfair to his brother officers, subordinates, or superiors, is 
what his assailant fails to show. 

1 Sherman's Historical Eaid. The Memoirs in the light of the Kecord. 
A review based upon compilations from the files of the War Office. By 
H. V. Boynton. 

(5) 



INTRODUCTORY. 



It should also be borne in mind that the Memoirs do 
not purport to be a complete history even of the transac- 
tions to which they refer, but are narrative statements, 
made by the author, of facts which came more or less com- 
pletely within his personal knowledge. There are thou- 
sands of officers beside Sherman who could give the public 
an interesting narrative of their personal recollections and 
experiences, which would doubtless bring to light a great 
mass of facts hitherto unknown; and, although such narra- 
tives are not of themselves history, they are the material 
out of which correct history can best be written. It is to 
be regretted that these officers do not collect and publish 
their contributions to this material. It is well known that 
many things, important in their bearing on events, never 
reach the light through official sources, sometimes to the 
glorification of the undeserving and to the injustice of 
the meritorious. Our people and posterity have a far 
greater interest in the truth of history than in the reputa- 
tion of any man or set of men, if such reputations have 
not been fairly earned. But, on the other hand, all citi- 
zens have a claim and an interest in the deserved honors 
of their nation's illustrious men, and he who seeks to un- 
justly tarnish their fair fame strikes at that nation's great- 
ness and at that people's common inheritance. If all are 
judged in accordance with the above, there can be no 
complaint. 

Eut, for some different reason not generally understood, 
this reviewer, as the Washington correspondent of the Cin- 
cinnati Gazette, embarked, in his letters to that paper, in an 
attack upon General Sherman and his Memoirs, and from 
these letters compiled this book. It is gratifying to know 
that he, at least, was able to obtain copies of the official 
records ! 

Much of the running commentary which is inter- 
spersed, as their author says, to connect and explain the 
record, is interesting, not only for the reason claimed to be 
its purpose, but also because it discloses the spirit in which 
the book is written. These comments need no inter[>reter. 
They are easily comprehended. 



INTRODUCTORY. 



Among his first statements, he asserts that the Memoirs 
are "egotistical," "unreliable, and unjust;" and that their 
author "detracts from what rightfully belongs to Grant;" 
" mispresents and belittles Thomas ; withholds justice from 
Buell; repeatedly loads failures for which he was responsi- 
ble, now upon Thomas, now upon Schofield, now upon 
McPherson, and again upon the three jointly; is unjust in 
the extreme to Rosecrans; sneers at Logan and Blair; in- 
sults Hooker, and slanders Stanton ;" and further, in efiect, 
that, as a military commander, he was careless and incapa- 
ble; that he betrayed the trust confided in him by a pohti- 
cal surrender to the Confederate General Johnston. In 
summing up his case against him, at the conclusion of his 
book, the reviewer reiterates most of these charges, and 
adds to them several others, which, he says, are proven 
by the ofiicial files. 

These statements are broad enough to attract atten- 
tion, especially when made under such circumstances and 
in such connection as to almost create the impression that 
the book is the indirect production of the War Depart- 
ment. This impression is strengthened by the fact that 
there is a certain ex cathedra style running through his 
statements which indicates that the ideas were inspired at 
that office . 

It presents a somewhat singular spectacle to see the 
ofiicers of the War Department furnishing material for an 
attack upon the integrity and capacity of the General of 
the army. The student of history will, however, be 
thankful for the documents published by the reviewer, 
and will not be likely to cavil at the cause which has led 
to their publication. 



CHAPTER II. 

FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
The credit which the Review first gives, then denies, Grant. 

In the opening paragraph of the chapter relating to 
the above named forts, General Sherman is presented to 
the reader as an officer deserving severe condemnation 
for ingratitude and injustice to General Grant. The 
specific charge on which this is based is " a deliberate at- 
tempt to take from General Grant the credit which belongB 
to him " for his movements on these two forts, and to as- 
sign it to General Halleck. 

A careful examination of the Memoirs will show that 
Sherman gives Halleck the credit of 'planning the move 
which resulted in the capture of these forts, and to General 
Grant and Commodore Foote and their respective forces he 
attributes the praise for taking them. A like examination of 
the Review (pp. 10-13) shows that in effect, its author claims 
for General Grant all the credit for both 'planning and exe- 
cuting the move. The records produced only prove, at most, 
that Halleck had contemplated this move long before 
Grant ever suggested it to him, but that- he (Grant), by 
Halleck's permission, attempted it and succeeded sooner 
and with less troops than the latter thought it could be 
done. The extract from the Memoirs (Review, p. 11), 
states that Halleck, at least a month before Grant's move, 
was seated in a room with a map before him, with two of 
his subordinates, CuUom and Sherman, near him, and that 
he asked for the views of these two as to the proper place to 
attack the rebel lines. One of them suggested "the 
center," which a pencil line, then made by Halleck, showed 
would coincide nearly with the course of the Tennessee 
river. Halleck then said: "That's the true line of opera- 
tions." 

It can not be seen from the above how long this very 
(8) 



FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 



plan may have been in Halleck's mind. It only shows 
that it was also in the mind of Cullom or Sherman, or 
both, before it was executed by any body, and that pos- 
sibly this advice strengthened Halleck's own favorable 
opinion of it. Indeed, it appears from the following 
quotations that he had long been thinking about this move. 
The reviewer quotes extracts from a letter dated 
January 20th (p. 12), from Halleck to McClellan, which, 
the reviewer says, " are sufficient to settle the question at 
issue." So they are. The following are sentences referring 
to the plan of operations : 

" The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam, is, in my opinion, 
impracticable, or at least premature. It is not the proper line of opera- 
tions, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the CMmSer- 
Zanrf awrf Te/znessee,! making Nashville the present objective point. . . 
This line of the Cumberland and Tennessee is the great central line of 
the western theater of war, with the Ohio, below the mouth of Green river, 
as the base, and the two great navigable rivers extending far into the 
theater of operations." 

" These suggestions are hastily written out, but lltey are the result of 
much anxious inquiry and m.ature deliberation. I am confident that the 
plan, if properly carried out, will produce important results." 

No attempt is made to show that, up to this time, 
Grant had in any way suggested or proposed this plan to 
Halleck, or offered to take either fort. But on the 28/A 
of January, one v)eek after the above letter was written, Grant 
proposed to General Halleck to take Fort Henry, obtained 
his consent, and took it on the 6th of February, and Fort 
Donelsonon the 16th. 

This is the substance of the evidence by which it is 
sought to prove that Grant planned as well as executed the 
move against these forts, and on which are based the grave 
charges against General Sherman, found in the opening 
paragraph ! 

But on p. 13, the reviewer, with a sudden change of 
base, says that " if General Sherman had searched, the 
records with the least care he would ;, have found " that 
General Buell had suggested to Halleck. long before this, 

1 The italics in this and other extract* are mine,T-M. 



10 FOKTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 

just about the same move that Grant afterward carried 
out. Evidence to prove this is furnished (pp. 13-18). 
Then it was neither Grant nor Halleck who originated the 
idea after all ! But as the reviewer himself takes pains to 
show us (Eeview, p. 3) that Sherman only proposes to give 
" his recollection of events, corrected by a reference to his 
own memoranda," it is plainly wrong to censure Sherman 
for not giving the credit to Buell or to Grant instead of to 
Halleck, as neither his recollection nor his memoranda could 
furnish him any knowledge of Buell's correspondence with 
Halleck. 



CHAPTER III. 



Our army not surprised. Generous treatment of Buell's army. 

In Chapter III., the reviewer discusses the buttle of 
Shiloh^ and the alleged unfair treatment of Buell and his 
arm\'. 

In treating of the observations in the Memoirs about this 
battle, the reviewer undertakes to show, Firsts that the Union 
forces were surprised, and that Sherman was responsible for 
this ; Second, that the positions of the various divisions 
with reference to each other was bad, for which also Slier- 
man was responsible; Third, that Sherman wronged Buell 
and his troops by not mentioning them more fully and 
favorably in his Memoirs. 

It is not my purpose, nor is it necessary, to go exten- 
sively into the history of this battle, for the purpose of con- 
tradicting the foolish stories about our forces being sur- 
prised by the enemy, at its beginning. No matter what 
were the reasons for starting them originally in the news- 
papers and elsewhere, there is not the slightest excuse for 
reiterating them at this time. Almost every one of the 
many extracts from the records found in the Review (pp. 
26-35), contradicts these stories. The substance of these 
extracts may be fairly gathered from the following quota- 
tions : 

"All my* troops were in line of battle, ready. . . I gave 
necessary orders to the battery (Waterhouse'.--) attached to Hildebrand'a 
brigade, and cautioned the men to reserve their fire till the rebels had 
crossed the ravine at Owl Creek and had begun the ascent. Also sent staff 
oflScers to notify Generals McClernand and Prentiss of the coming blow. 
Indeed, McClernand had already sent three regiments to the support of 
my left flank. They were in position when the onset came." 

^ The reader is referred to Van Home's History of the Arm3' of the 
Cumberland lor a fair and full history of this battle. K. Clarke & Co., 
Cincinnati. 

^From Sherman's official report of Battle of Sliiloh. Review, p. 28. 

(11) 



12 SHILOH. 



1" Between 6 and 7 o'clock on Sunday morning, I was informed that 
our pickets were fired upon. I immediately gave orders for forming the 
brigade on the color line, which was promptly done." 

2" On the morning of the 6th, our regiment met the enemy about two 
hundred yards in front of our color line." 

3 " On Sunday morning, April 6, about half-past 7, 1 received a message 
from Brigadier-General Sherman that he was attacked in force heavily 
upon his left. I immediately ordered Colonel J. C. Veach, commanding 
the Second Brigade, to proceed to the left of General Sherman. This 
brigade, consisting of Twenty-fifth Indiana, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and 
Forty-sixth Illinois, was in march in ten minutes, arrived on General 
Sherman's line rapidly, and went into action." 

*" About 7 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, heavy and rapid firing 
of artillery was heard, and in a few minutes we received orders to form 
in line of battle in front of our camp. This order was obeyed with a cool- 
ness and promptness highly creditable to the officers and men." 

It is shown, on p. 34 and p. 35, that the heavy fighting 
did not begin until about 8 o'clock; but previous to this, 
Buckland's brigade had advanced about forty rods from 
their color line and opened fire on the rebels, instead of 
being surprised by them. (P. 33.) 

The documents cited by the reviewer, together with 
other reports^ of ofiicers at the front, show that these offi- 
cers were in a constant state of watchfulness ; that the 
pickets were not less than two and a half miles out, and 
were strengthened as occasion required ; that reconnois- 
sance in force were made from time to time, and that both 
these and the pickets reported the presence of cavalry and 
infantry to the division commanders, who were on the qui 
Vive in consequence, and that their troops were in line of 
battle on the morning of the attack. 

1 From Colonel Buckland's official report to General Sherman. Re- 
view, p. 33. 

2 From Lieutenant-Colonel Purlin's report. Forty-eighth Ohio. Re- 
view, p. 134. 

2 General Hurlburt's official report of Battle of Shiloh. 
* Colonel B. H. Bristow's report of Battle of Shiloh. 
5 Senate Doc. No. 66, 2d Session, 37th Congress. 



SHILOH. 13 



Since the reviewer himself has completely refuted these 
absurdities abont a surprise,Mt would be idle to pay any at- 
tention to his efforts to show that Sherman, a subordinate 
commander, was responsible for it. 

As to whether the Union officers knew the plans and 
purposes of the enemy, or even the numbers and disposition 
of their forces as early as the reviewer intimates they should 
have known, is a very different matter. If these officers, 
under the circumstances, were in doubt as to the intentions 
of the rebel leaders, but were ready for any emergency, 
they are not liable to censure. We now know from rebel 
sources^ that they did not fully determine until the second 
of April (their forces were then scattered from Corinth to 
luka) to make the attack ; that the main body of their 
troops did not reach the vicinity of Sliiloh, and that they 
did not definitely fix the date of the attack until late in 
the evening of the fifth. The battle began early on the 
sixth. It is readily seen from the above that to accuse our 
officers of blindness, criminal carelessness or incapacity for 
not knowing the plans of the enemy previous to the eve of 
battle, implies that it was their duty to know the date of 

^ As to the rebels' view of this surprise, this sentence from Polhird's 
"Lost Cause," on p. 239, where he describes their advance to the attack, is 
significant: "But the enemy scarcely gave time to discuss the question of 
attack, for soon after dawn he commenced a rapid musketry fire on the 
Confederate pickets." On the same page, he shows that they had no in- 
considerable amount of fighting to do with our advance parties and pick- 
ets, before they came to Sherman's main line. 

There is not as much evidence to support the assertions that our army 
was surprised in this battle, as there was for the assertion that Wellington 
was surprised at Brussels into the battle of Waterloo. It could be shown 
that he was at an entertainment at the Duchess of Richmond's on the 
evening of the 15th of June, and that an attack was made upon his forces 
at Quatre Bras on that day; that the troops so attacked, retreated during 
the two succeeding days, and that the battle of the 18th was fought twelve 
miles from the first point of attack, the duke having retreated that distance 
before he fought the decisive action; and that, up to the very day of the 
fight at Quatre Bras, he did not know precisely the point at which the at- 
tack would be made. Popular writers of that day made a liberal use of 
these ideas at the time. 

*"Lost Cause," pp. 238, 239. 



14 SHILOH. 



attack before the rebels had decided upon the time of mak- 
ing it, or their troops were on the ground ! 



With reference to the charge concerning the positions 
of the various divisions, it is only necessary to state that 
Sherman was a subordinate officer, in command of one 
division only, and the reviewer does not even attempt to 
prove " by the record " that he was responsible for these 
positions, if wrong, or that he could be so considered. 



In reviewing what the Memoirs say about Buell and 
his army, the reviewer labors to make Sherman appear 
guilty of ingratitude for a personal favor rendered by 
Buell, as well as grossly unjust to him and his troops. 
Among other things, he says : 

"All would suppose that when the author of the Memoirs sat down 
to write his version of Shiloh, he would at least have done bare justice to 
Buell and his army ; but the reader will look for it in vain." 

Both in the narrative part, lately written, of the Me- 
moirs, and in his official report of the battle of Shiloh, which 
is inserted in full in vol. 1, p. 235, Sherman speaks repeatedly 
of this army, and of its officers by name, in even higher 
terms than the reviewer himself. A few of these passages 
are here quoted: 

" Here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact columns 
of General Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldiery movements at once 
gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined forces. Here I saw Wil- 
lich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind 
which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful 
style. Then arose the severest musketry fire I ever heard, and lasted some 
twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back." 

" The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh, and another near Ham- 
burg road, both pouring grape and cannister upon any column of troops 
that advanced toward the green point of water-oaks. Willich's regi- 
ment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division ad- 
vanced beautifully, deployed and entered this dreaded woods." 

" Eousseau's brigade moved, in splendid, order, steadily to the front, 
sweeping everything before it." 



SHILOH. 15 



" McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy 
along the Corinth road, . . . where Beauregard commanded 
in person." 

Sherman nowhere speaks in as high terms as these of 
his oion troops engaged in this battle! 

To compare with this, we will state what General Grant 
has said about the same troops on this occasion, together 
wnth the reviewer's comments on it (Review, p. 42) : 

" Concerning the actors in this battle, General Grant says: 
" ' Of the part taken by each separate command, I can not take special 
notice in this report, but will do so more fully' when the reports of the 
division commanders are handed in. General Buell coming on the field 
with a distinct army long under his command, and which did such etBcient 
service, commanded by himself in person on the field, will be much better 
able to notice those of his command who particularly distinguished them- 
selves, than I possibly can.' " 

" In this report General Grant says nothing of himself, and nil of good 
that he could about others." 

If this is all the good he could say about Buell and his 
troops, he certainly has said far less than General Sher- 
man did. But let us see what comment the reviewer makes 
about Sherman's words of praise (Review, p. 39) ; which 
words, however, knowing, as he must, that they would con- 
demn him, he does not give, nor does he in any way lead 
his readers to suspect their import: "But," he says, "it 
has never heretofore answered General Sherman's purpose 
to state the facts about Buell's army at Shiloh." 

Such downright unfairness as this can only be the 
ofispring of malice joined to a vindictive spirit, which men 
of small understanding can easily develop by careful train- 
ing and long practice. 

' No other report was afterward made by Grant. 



CHAPTER IV. 

lUKA AND CORINTH. 
General Rosecrans defended. 

In this chapter, the reviewer invites attention to the bat- 
tle at luka, and attempts to fix upon the Memoirs a misrep- 
resentation of General Rosecrans. It has alwa3^s been under- 
stood that Grant was disappointed with the conduct of 
Rosecrans upon that occasion, and the Memoirs give sub- 
stantially the same account of this affair as the best in- 
formed writers^ have given, varying as personal recollec- 
tions usually vary from accounts made up from reports, 
documents, etc., but there is no expression in the Memoirs 
of disrespect toward General Rosecrans. They do say 
that Grant was offended with him, and the facts sustain the 
statement. There had been delay, caused, according to Gen- 
eral Grant's official report, " by the blundering of a guide." 
It seems that the delay in attacking Price, in concert with 
General Ord, deranged Grant's plans. This offended or dis- 
appointed him. The blundering of the guide misled Rose- 
crans, and caused the delay. The Memoir says " Grant was 
off"ended;" but, "that in his (Sherman's) experience, these 
concerted movements generally fail, unless with the best of 
troops, and then in a country on whose roads some reliance 
can be placed, which is not the case in northern Mississippi." 
It is plain that General Grant in his report is excusing Rose- 
crans for the delay, while commending him for what he ac- 
complished. The most reliable accounts which we have of 
the matter, are that Rosecrans dispatched to Grant, early in 
the evening of the 18th September, that he was about to 

1 An intelligent writer, speaking of Grant's plans about these two 
battles, says: "He knew from his scouts that Van Dorn's army could not 
reacb Corinth for four days. This would give him time to punish Price's 
temerity at luka, and then return to receive Yan Dorn with a warm wel- 
come at Corinth. But every hour was of incalculable importance." — Grant 
and his Campaigns, p. 122. 
(16) 



lUKA AND CORINTH. 17 

move for luka, and would close in npon the enemy that 
nio^ht, pursuant to previous orders. General Ord was to ad- 
vance from Burnsville, while Rosecrans was to move north- 
ward, in two columns, from Rieiizi, and attack from that di- 
rection. Instead of moving at once, he was delayed until 
midnight, at which time he dispatched to Grant that he 
could not reach luka before one or two o'clock the next day. 
This was the disappointment, because Grant feared that 
Van Dorn would join Price, and his desire was to have Ord 
and Kosecrans join in the attack upon Price before this 
junction.^ The reader can readily understand the state- 
ments of the Memoirs, and that Grant's report excusing 
Kosecrans in no way tends to contradict the statement that 
he was otfended and disappointed. In his zeal to contra- 
dict the Memoir, the reviewer apparently fails to compre- 
hend the application of the language in the records. 

So far as the statements relate the retreat from Cor- 
inth, the facts are these. After the retreat of the rebels 
began, on the 5th (October), Rosecrans started in pur- 
suit, but by some error, he took a road north of the one 
which the rebels took, and they thus obtained a few hours 
the start of him. This advantage made it appear to General 
Grant useless to keeji up the pursuit, and so he ordered it 
discontinued against Rosecran's protest. I do not wish to 
express any opinion as to whether Grunt or Rosecrans was 
right in this matter, but the simple fact that Grant ordered 
the pursuit abandoned, and Rosecrans protested against 
abandoning it, is enough to authorize the statement in the 
Memoirs that Grant was displeased. Tliis inference is 
evident from the correspondence published by the reviewer. 
Instead, therefore, of his records tending to contradict Sher- 
man, they confirm his statements. 

J The following is Biidejiu's account. Military History of General 
Grant, p. 112, ei seq.: "On the 18th of Sepleinber, Ord was pushed fur- 
ward to within four miles of luka, where he found the enemy in force, on 
the north side of the town ; and the same day, Rosecrans reported to Grant 
his readiness 'to move up as close as we can to-night. . . . Ord to ad- 
vance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that 
way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on 



18 lUKA AND COEINTH. 



the Fulton road, and crushing in their left, cutting off their retreat east- 
ward. I propose to move in ten minutes for Jacinto.' Grant ordered him 
to advance rapidly, and 'let us do to-morrow all we can; it may be neces- 
sary to fall back the day following.' The falling back was in the event 
of Van Dorn's attack on Corinth. This dispatch was dated fifteen minutes 
before 7 p. m.; but, after midnight, Eosecrans sent word that he had been 
detained, and was still twenty miles from luka, and could not ' be in ' before 
1 or 2 o'clock the next afternoon, the roads being in bad condition and the 
country thickly wooded. This greatly disappointed Grant, who had ex- 
pected to fight on the morrow, early, and had supposed Rosecrans to be by 
this time far on his way to luka. He consequently directed Ord, who was 
quite ready to bring on an engagement iu an hour's time, not to attack 
from the north until Rosecrans arrived, or until he should hear firing in 
the south. Rosecrans was notified, by his return-messenger, of this change 
in Ord's instructions ; but owing to the density of the forests and the diffi- 
culty of crossing the small streams and bottoms, all communication be- 
tween Grant and Rosecrans was circuitous and delayed. . . . 

" The wind had blown heavily to the south and east the day before, and 
no sound of the firing had reached Ord; during the night, however, he 
had had word of the battle from negroes, and so pushed on toward the 
town, in the morning, in advance of Grant's order. Soon afterwards, 
Grant himself learned that the enemy were in full retreat; had in fact 
left luka during the night, on the Fulton road, which it had been ex- 
pressly arranged that Rosecrans was to occupy with Hamilton's division. 
Getting up late, however, he had failed to do this, and the rebels discover- 
ing how nearly they were surrounded by the concentration of Grant's 
forces, held Rosecrans in check on one road and escaped by night on the 
other, taking with them everything except their wounded, and the artil- 
lery they had captured the day before. "When Grant arrived at luka, at 
9 o'clock A. M., the pursuit was not yet begun. He at once gave orders to 
follow, but the enemy had already got so far that it was found impossible 
now to overtake him. 

" Grant had notified Rosecrans, in advance, of the movement of Hurl- 
but and Ord, and, anticipating the victory at Corinth, had directed that 
commander to push on instantly after his success, if necessary even to 
Bolivar; fpr, if Ord's little force encountered the whole rebel army, the 
danger would be great, unless Rosecrans followed up rapidly. But the 
troops were fatigued by two days' fight, and Rosecrans contented himself 
with riding over the field to announce in person his victory. At noon of 
the 4th he gave directions to rest that day, and move in pursuit on the 
morrow. When he reported his action to Grant, the latter, greatly disap- 
pointed at the delay, again issued peremptory orders to push on at once 
after the enemy. 

" Rosecrans started out on the morning of the 5th, but was misin- 
formed or misled, and took the road toward Chewalla, instead of that far- 
ther south, by which the eneniy had moved. After marching about eight 
miles out of the way, he discovered his blunder, and turned his column 
toward the Hatchie. 



lUKA AND CORINTH. 19 

" Had Rosecrans promptly moved the day before, he would have come 
up in the rear of Van Dorn, either as he was fighting Ord, or while at- 
tempting to pass this defile. In either event, the destruction of the rebels 
must have been complete; but the national forces arrived at the Hatchie, 
just as the rear-guard of the enemy bad crossed. Ilosecrans, from here, 
sent word again to Grant of the condition of afl'airs, and Grant decided 
that the favorable opportunity had been lost." 



CHAPTER V. 

CHICASAW BAYOU. 

A chapter of the Review is devoted to criticisms of 
the first assault upon Vicksburg, a movement which the 
reviewer states was planned, by General Grant, but was 
under the sole direction of General Sherman. The criti- 
cism seems directed against the execution of the move- 
ment rather than to the narrative which is given of it in 
the Memoirs. 

We are not told that the plan was a bad one, or that 
Sherman failed to execute the part that was assigned to 
him. It is well known that General Grant proposed, to 
co-operate with Sherman in this attack, but was prevented 
from doing so bj' the obstacles thrown in his way, and no- 
tably among them was the surrender of Holly Springs, on 
the 20th of^Deceruber. 

'No one, that I am aware of, has ever shown that the 
failure on the part of Grant to co-operate with Sherman 
was a reflection upon his capacity. His part in the expedi- 
tion consisted in engaging Pemberton in such a manner as 
to prevent reinforcements from being thrown into Vicks- 
burg. This was Jiot done, and Sherman found himself con- 
fronted by a larger force, upon his arrival at Vicksburg, 
than had been anticipated. In view of these facts, he with- 
drew after making sufficient attempts to convince himself 
that the city could not be taken by the forces under his 
command. It tiie events which prevented Grant's co- 
operation could have been foreseen, it is not probable that 
the expedition would have been ordered. The attempt to 
criticise Sherman because the roads were bad, and because 
the position was impregnable — if it amounts to anything — 
is a reflection u[»on General Grant, who appears to have 
planned and ordered it. Sherman's part of it was executed 
in accordance with his orders, and it is nowhere made to 

(20) 



CHICASAW BAYOU. 21 

appear thut General Grant was not satisfied with the 
manner in wliich he executed the movement. The failure 
of the expedition was caused hy unexpected and unfore- 
seen events. Such failures are not uncommon in miUtary 
operations. 

In narrating these events in the Memoirs, Sherman ex- 
presses an opinion that results might have been more satis- 
factory, if Generals Morgan and DeCourcy had been more 
prompt and energetic, and he says that General Blair was 
of a similar opinion. No attempt is made to show that this 
is not a just opinion, formed upon facts which support it. 
A slight attempt is made to show^ that this is different from 
the opinion expressed in his (Sherman's) official report of 
the affair. The reviewer fails in this attempt. An exam- 
ination of the report shows that he speaks in a guarded 
manner of General Morgan's operations. 

It is evident that, in the report, he is disposed to take 
all the responsibility for the failure upon himself, saying 
nothing, however, that is not strictly true, yet withholding 
a portion of his opinions for obvious reasons. But when, 
twelve years after these occurrences, he undertakes to write 
his opinions in full, he places the responsibility where he 
thought at the time it belonged. 

This is the common-sense view of the matter, and 
when the report and narrative are compared, the alleged 
contradictions disappear. 

The reviewer states that immediately after this action 
General Morgan was assigned to the command of a corps 
under General McCleruand, who succeeded Sherman in 
command of the army. He does not, it is true, state in 
terms that these assignments grew out of this expedition; 
but the manner in which the statement is made is evidently 
intended to leave that impression. The reviewer must 
have known that these assignments were made without 
reference to the failure at Vicksburg. The attempt to 
make it appear that Sherman was relieved and Morgan 
promoted by reason of the management of the Vicksburg 
expedition, is an attempt at deception. 



CHAPTER VI. 

CHATTANOOGA. 
Unsustained insinuations. 

" In a previous chapter, it has been seen how coldly, 
unjustly, and almost contemptuously General Sherman's 
book treats of Buell and his army at Shiloh." With these 
words, the reviewer begins a chapter, in which he charges 
Sherman with treating Rosecrans and Thomas, and the 
forces they commanded, in substantially the same way ; and 
the measure of his fairness and success in the former case 
is a good index of the same in the latter. 

The charge that Sherman failed to move with due 
haste to the aid of Rosecrans, while the latter was lying on 
the Chickamauga, in 1863, and thus became responsible, in 
part, at least, for his misfortunes, is not only false, but so 
stupidly false that their author must have seen this himself 
if he read the records which he prints. These records may 
be separated into three parts with reference to their intended 
use. From the first part (pp. 73-78), it appears that President 
Lincoln and General Halleck attempted to compel Burn- 
side to move from Knoxville to the support of Rosecrans, 
then considered to be in great danger. These dispatches 
are probably furnished to show that great urgency was re- 
quired, and promptness expected — from Burnside ; but what 
their application as to Sherman may be, we are left to con- 
jecture. 

The second part of these dispatches (pp. 79, 80), seem 
to be printed to create the impression, by inference, that Sher- 
man was delaying^ on the way from Vicksburg to Mem- 
phis, as they contain expressions from Halleck, in Wash- 
ington, to Hurlbut, in Memphis, urging all possible prompt- 
ness on Sherman's part, and stating that nothing had been 
heard from him since a certain date. But Halleck's dis- 

^ This is nowhere charged directly. 

(22) 



CHATTANOOGA. 23 



patch ^ of September 18, to Rosecrans (p. 80, Review), ex- 
plains all this. Steamers had to be sent from Memphis to 
Vicksburg', the camps on the Big Black had to be broken 
up, and troops and baggage transferred from there to these 
boats, which then had to ascend to Memphis, and "there 
being no telegraph line," no word had reached Washing- 
ton yet. 

The dispatches (pp. 80, 81), relating to the time after 
his leaving Memphis, can not, even by inference, be tortured 
into showing that Sherman was not making all possible 
haste consistent with his orders. The following extracts 
are essential parts of these very dispatches : 

"He (Rosecrans) wishes them (Sherman's troops) sent by Tuscumbia, 
Decatur, and Athens- As this requires the opening of the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad cast of Corinth, an able commander, like Sherman or 
McPherson, should be selected." (Halleck to Grant, p. 80.) 

"All available forces must be pushed on toward General Rosecrans as 
fast as possible. Your attention must he directed far iicularly to the repair 
ing of the railroad and the transportation of supplies toward Decatur." 
(Halleck to Hurlbut, pp. 80, 81.) 

"As fast as troops arrive, thej' should be pushed forward, first to Co- 
rinth and then to Tuscumbia, repairing the Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
road." . . . "The railroad must be kept up and guarded, in order to 
secure the supplies of your army." (Halleck to Hurlbut, p. 81.) 

The fact that much of the railroad from Nashville to 
Chattanooga was then, and for some time afterward, in such 
wretched condition, and so poorly supplied with rolling- 
stock, as to be barely capable of supplying the army already 
at the latter place, is so well known as to need no proof 
here; and this state of affairs was the cause of these orders. 

The fact that Sherman was desirous of hastening to 
Rosecrans faster than his work permitted, is shown by his 

1 War Department, September 28, 1863. 
Major -General Eosecrans, Chattanooga : 

Grant's forces (which included Sherman's command) were ordered to 
move by Memphis, Corinth, and Tuscumbia to Decatur, and thence, as 
might be found necessary, to co-operate with you. . . . The order was 
received on the 18th, and steamers sent to Vicksburg to bring up the 
troops. They calculated to be able to communicate with you in fourteen 
days from that time. Since then, nothing has been heard from them, there 
being no telegraph line. The troops from here will probably reach you 
first. 



24 CHATTAJfOOGA. 



dispatch from beyond Corinth (Review, p. 81), asking 
"whether I shall give preference to securing the railroad 
or reaching the neighborhood of Athens with expedition. 
The latter, I can surely accomplish; the former is prob- 
lematical." To this dispatch (p. 81) Halleck replied, on 
the r4th, telling him to take care of his railroad. When 
Grant reached the front, he told Sherman to leave the rail- 
road and come on. These facts fully explain the increased 
celerity of Sherman's movement after Grant assumed com- 
mand at Chattanooga. 

Great stress is laid on the fact that the 11th and 12th 
Corps reached Rosecrans sooner than Sherman did, as 
though this were to the latter's discredit. Common sense 
will slioAV the reader, if it didn't the reviewer, that this was 
likely to happen, as they came riding on railroads almost 
the entire distance, whilst Sherman's troops were marching 
&x\di rebuilding a railroad much of the distance. 

Great stress also appears to be laid upon the fact, that 
General Sherman failed to collate the records of the War 
Department, for the purpose of showing the operations of 
General Rosecrans more completely in detail, with refer- 
ence to the battles of Chattanooga and Chickamauga. It 
is quite probable that if all the records relating to these 
battles were published, much of the blame which was cast 
upon General Rosecrans would be removed, and it is to be 
hoped that this will be done. But it should be remem- 
bered that Sherman was describing his own operations, and 
was not attempting to write the memoirs of General Rose- 
crans, nor compiling general history. 

The Memoirs, at p. 361, relate a conversation which 
occurred between Sherman and Grant, after the former's 
arrival at headquarters, in which the difficulties of the situ- 
ation were discussed. It is stated by Sherman, that " Grant 
said that the mules and horses of Thomas' army were so 
starved that they could not haul his guns ; that forage, corn, 
and provisions were so scarce, that the men stole the few 
grains of corn that were given to favorite horses," etc. The 
reviewer quotes portions of this statement, and then asserts, 
by inference again, that Grant could not have made it — thus 



CHATTANOOGA. 25 



charging Sherman with direct falsehood. To prove that 
Grant made no such statement, he prodnces his dispatches 
to Halleck, of October 26th and 28th, which, in substance, 
say that Thomas' plan for securing the river would pro- 
vide the necessary supjilies. 

The dispatch of Grant to Halleck, on the very next 
page, dated N'ovember 21st, states that the condition of the 
Army of the Cumberland, then commanded by Thomas, 
was fixed and immovable; that the loss of animals was re- 
ported to exceed ten thousand, and that those left were 
hardly able to carry themselves. 

The dispatches of October 26th and 28th do not con- 
tradict Sherman's statement, and the dispatch of Novem- 
ber 21st certainly confirms it. 

The degree of the reviewer's fiiirness can be seen also 
by the persistent manner in which he attacks Sherman for 
having charged that Thomas' troops could not be drawn 
from- their trenches for a fight. After showing how bravely 
and well these troops did fight (which no one denies), the 
reviewer says (p. 88) : " General Sherman must have thought 
all this rather lively work for troops that could not be in- 
duced to leave their trenches till they had been persuaded 
by the surprising spectacle of his men (Sherman's) making 
a breakfast of the enemy." 

The reader should remember that Sherman nowhere 
makes the charge attributed to him, but says that Grant 
told Am (Review, p. 71) "that the men of Thomas' army 
had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga 
that he feared they could not be got out of their trenches 
to assume the ofiensive." That Grant did not say this is 
certainly not proved by producing -an order issued a week 
before the statement was made, nor by showing that 
Thomas had no lack of confidence in his troops, nor yet by 
the fact that these troops did afterward leave their trenches 
and fight nobly and with success. 



CHAPTER VIL 

GENERAL THOMAS. 
General Thomas neither belittled nor misrepresented. 

The reviewer charges that the Memoirs not only mis- 
judged Thomas, but that they intentionally misrepresent 
and belittle him. To sustain this assertion, he summons 
to his aid the record, which utterly fails to do so. Inas- 
much as it was generally understood that the author of 
the Memoirs entertained a high o[»inion of Thomas as 
a soldier, and knowing that there was great personal friend- 
ship ^ between them, I read the statements in the review 
with considerable surprise, and especially the one charging 
Sherman with being " a calumniator of the dead." The 
assertions there made induced me to re-examine the Mem- 
oirs and ascertain particulary what their author has stated 
which was so derogatory to General Thomas. 

After a tolerably close comparison of all these state- 
ments, they can be summed up, with one or two exceptions 
(to be noted hereafter), to be an assertion that he (Thomas) 
was a little slow in executing military movements. 

' Sherman himself, in the Memoirs, furnishes sufficient evidence of this 
friendship. In vol. 1, p. 177, he says: "My friend and classmate, George 
H. Thomas, was there (on the Potomac) in command of a brigade." 

On p. 250: "General Thomas at once (after Shiloh) assumed command 
of the right wing, and, until we reached Corinth, I served immediately under 
his command. "We were classmates, intimately acquainted; had served to- 
gether before in the old army, and in Kentucky, and it made little differ- 
ence to us who commanded the other, provided the good cause prevailed." 
"When it is remembered that Sherman had formerly commanded Thomas, 
in Kentucky, and how averse military men usually are to serving under 
the immediate command of former subordinates, and that they frequently 
preferred to leave the army entirely, as General Palmer did, at Atlanta, 
rather than so serve, the full force of this will be comprehended. 

Other extracts might be given, but these are sufficient. 
(26) 



GENERAL THOMAS. 27 

Thomas is referred to in a great number of places^ in 
the Memoirs in such terms as to leave no doubt that Sher- 
man's opinion of him is that he was one of the finest soldiers 
in the arm3^ That such is his opinion is also manifest from 
the fact that for years he has been the public eulogist of 
both Thomas and McPherson, as the general reader doubt- 
less remembers. 

The Memoirs are intended as a narrative of their 
author's experiences, incidentally alluding to the character- 
istics of the other officers with whom he held official and 
personal relations. It is evident in all that is said about 
Thomas, that the effort is made to explain to the reader a few 
of his personal traits, such as were known to his friends. It 
is because such traits are furnished in narratives, like the 
Memoirs, that tljey become valuable as an auxilliary to gen- 
eral . history. Official acts of a prominent and successful 
military commander like Thomas are usually well known 
to the public ; but the real student of history desires to 
compare the public acts of prominent men with the private 
traits of character. 

Such a student desires the truth, and that only. It is 
of no consequence that Thomas was slow in moving his 
array; he was successful as a commander — more so per- 
haps than if he had been more active. Slow or active, his 
fame is fixed and will endure while the history of the war 
shall last. Sherman should not be arraigned for saying 
that he was slow, unless the statement is untrue. It appears 
from the appended letters of the officers who knew him 
best and loved him most, that they were of the same opinion 
as that expressed in the Memoirs. These otiicers were in a 
position to have personal knowledge of his character. 
Their reputation is such as to forbid us to presume that 
they would misstate the facts. The evidence, therefore, 

' In Review (p. 178), its author says : " Perhaps the most glaring in- 
stance of injustice to General Thomas fi/und in the book appears on p. 209." 
He then quotes from one of Sherman's letters to Grant, the language al- 
leged to be so unjust, and in the very extract quoted this sentence appears: 
"1 know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action, but 
he is judicious and brave, and the iroops feel great confidence in him." 



28 GENERAL THOMAS. 

upon this point sustains the Memoirs, and fails to support 
the reviewer's charges against Sherman. 

In the chapters entitled "Aftairs at Nashville" (chap. 
XIII) and "Thomas' Troubles at Nashville," (chap. XIV), 
the reviev^er's main points seem to be — 1. That when Sher- 
man started on his march to the sea, he left Thomas behind 
"to grap[»le with Hood at every disadvantage" (id. p. 176)5 
with forces plainly insufficient for the task, etc. ; 2. That by 
dispatching to Grant that these forces were sufficient, he 
did Thomas an injustice, and by so doing became largely 
responsible for the troubles which Thomas suffi^red from 
Grant and others at Washington (id. p. 175) ; and, 3. That 
Sherman unjustly complained of the slowness of Thomas 
in attacking Hood. 

To the last of these, it may be replied that, justly or 
not, with the evidence then before them each, the Presi- 
dent,^ the Secretary of War, the Commander-in-Cliief, the 
country at large, and at least a large part of Thomas's 
own officers, were dissatisfied with or alarmed by his delay, 
and this feeling was not dispelled till Thomas so splendidly 
succeeded in defeating and destroying Hood at Xashville. 

As to the second point, the reviewer himself gives the 
most abundant evidence that Thomas was reporting directly 
to Grant and the authorities at Washington, and that there- 
fore they knew at first hand, and not through Sherman, 
just what his forces were, and did not rely on Sherman's 
judgment as to tlieir sufficiency. 

As to the first charge, it is only necessary to say that 
the events culminating in Hood's destruction showed that 
the forces were su^cient to accomplish that object, in the 
hands of an able general ; and Thomas had been left to do 
the work because he was considered an able general. 
That he himself considered he had forces enough to do the 
work assigned him, is fully shown by his dispatch of (No- 
vember 12), from Nashville, to Sherman at Kingston, where 
the latter had been waiting to further aid Thomas, if nec- 
essary, before starting for Savannah, and destroying the 

iSee dispatches published in Keview, especially pp. 184-193. 



GENERAL THOMAS. 29 

railroad communication between them. This dispatch is 
referred to in the Keview (p. 179), and is found in Memoirs 
(vol. 2 p. 169). The following is the part pertinent to this 
• matter: 

Maj.-Gen, Sherman: — Your dispatch of 12 o'clock last iiiylit is re- 
ceived. I have no fears that Beauregard (Hood, in fact), can do us 
any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you, I will follow him as 
far as possible. Il he does not follow you, I will then thoroughly organize 
my troops, and believe I shall have men enough to ruin him, 7i/defin he get out 
of the way very rapidly,''^ Geo. H. Thomas. 

Slierman, on the receipt of this, cut his commuications, 
and started on his march to the sea. 



The letters hereto appended explain themselves. 

Grant to Halleck. 

November 21, 1863. 
"I ordered an attack here two weeks ago, but it was impossible to 
move artillery. Now Thomas' chief of artillery says he has to borrow 
teams from Sherman to move a part of his artillery to where it is to be 
used. Sherman has used almost superhuman eflbrts to get up even at this 
time, and his force is really the only one I can now move. Tliomas can 
take about one gun to each battery, and can go as far with his infantry as 
his men can carry rations to keep them and bring them back. / have never 
felt such restlessness before, as I have at the fixed and immovable comiition of 
the Army of the Cumberland. The quartermaster-general i-tates that the 
loss ot animals here will exceed ten thousand. Those lelt, are scarcely able 
to carry themselves." U. S. Grant, ilajur-General. 

Grant to Sherman. 

City Point, March 16, 1865. 
. . Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I have 
been attempting to get something done in the west, both to co-operate 
■with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weakness there — to accom- 
plish results favorable to us. Knowing Thomas to be slow beyond excuse, 
1 depleted his army to reinforce Canby. . U.S. Grant, 

Lieutenant- General. 



[The following is part of a letter written by General Grant to General 
Sherman, January 21, 1865. The remainder of this letter is lound in the 
second volume of Memoirs, p. 257 :] 

January 21, 1865. 
"I was induced to do this (i. e. to detach Schofield's 
corps from Thomas) because I did not believe Thomas cuuld possibly 
be got ofl' before spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness 



30 GENERAL THOMAS. 



that satisfied me he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. 
The command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst 
Thomas followed far behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and 
those in pursuit had reached it, Thomas had not much more than half 
crossed the State, from which he returned to Nashville to take the steamer 
to Eastport. He is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness, and 
honesty, but is not good on a pursuit. He also reported bis troops fagged, 
and that it was necessary to equip up. This report, and a determination 
to give the enemy no rest, determined me to use his surplus troops else- 
where." U. S. Grant. 



Athkns, Ohio, July 12, 1875. 
Gen. W. T. Sherman : 

Dear Sir: — I have from time to time read the ingenious and rather 
bitter reviews of certain portions of your "Memoirs" by Gen. Boynton, in 
the Cincinnati Gazette. So much as relates to your published comments 
and historical statements of the campaign of Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, and 
more especially his last great campaign of 1864, I have read with great 
interest. Neither to Gen. Boynton nor any one else do I yield the palm 
for devotion to the memory and history of Gen. Thomas. I served under 
him, often under his observation, from October, 1862, until the end of the 
war, and until November, 1865. I commanded a brigade at Nashville, 
and served all through his campaigns of that year. 

It may be, in some degree gratifying to you, if I assure you that jeal- 
ous as I am of the fame of Thomas, gratified as I am for his unsought in- 
dorsement of my own character as a soldier, and confident as I am that 
his record is without a blemish or "spot or wrinkle or any such thing," yet 
nothing that you have written of him and his campaigns do I criticise as 
untrue, unjust, or even injudicious and ill-timed. 

The misgivings you had in your tent away oflT from us pressed heavily 
upon us around our camp fires at Nashville. We who were in inferior 
positions of command, felt, or at least feared, that the long delays were 
likely to be fatal in the end; and often, between November 30 and Decem- 
ber 15, as I rode along the familar lines of our army and saw the solid 
works of Hood going up, I felt the moments of delay were golden, and 
perhaps fatal ones to us. 

That my impatience and misgivings were without reasonable cause, 
now appears aflBrmatively ; and yet it existed, and was reasonable at the 
time. Our apprehensions did not take the shape of doubts of the zeal or 
competency of Thomas, so much as a dread of some obstacles to our pro- 
gress, of the existence and magnitude of which we did not know and com- 
prehend. I am general. 

Your obedient servant, 

C. H. Grosvenob. 



St Louis, Mo., July 13, 1875. 
General C. H Grosvenor, Athens, Ohio. 

Mt dear General: . . I thank you for your frank, honest, and 
manly letter of July 12th, just received, and it may be of interest for you 



GENEEAL THOMAS. 31 



to know that I have a similar assurance from many others, beside any 
quantity of official matter that sustain my "Memoirs." . . To me it 
seems simply ridiculous that Boynton should arraign me for stripping 
General Thomas of his well earned fame, he who in life never had a kind 
word for General Thomas, whereas, I have been his intimate friend and 
eulogist for forty years (since 1836.) 

In the "Memoirs" is recorded the fact that I united with General 
Robert Anderson, in applying in person to President Lincoln for his com- 
mission of Brigadier-General, and that we had to pledge our words for 
Thomas's fidelity, because he was a Virginian, that we began service to- 
gether in Kentucky, and that in the Corinth movement, Thomas was com- 
manding the right wing in which I had a division, reciting our intimate 
personal friendship and relations, and "that it made no difference to us 
which commanded the other, provided the good cause prevailed;" that 
when we came together again at Chattanooga, and in the Atlanta cam- 
paign, I relied on him mainly, consulting with him daily, and making no 
great movement without his assent, and when the crisis was at hand, I 
committed to him the absolute command of every soldier subject to my 
orders, except those with me on the "march,*" and thereby gave him the 
opportunity at Nashville, which completed his grand character and fame. 
I have from that day to this been his eulogist, and because I simply re- 
corded, what was notorious, what ^is admitted by his warmest and best 
friends, that he was slow, deliberate, and almost passive in the face of ex- 
asperating danger, but true as steel when the worst came. Some men who 
before were silent, now become his defenders as against me. . . . 

Excuse so long a letter, but I wanted to write this to some one, and am 
willing to confide it to you. With great respect, your friend, 

W. T. Sherman, General. 

In a recent letter he also speaks of Thomas as follows : 

Headquaktkrs Army of the United States, \ 
St. Louis, November 18, 1875./ 

Gentlemen: — I have the pleasure to receive your letter a day or two 
since, and yesterday got the book, "Van Home's History of the Army of 
the Cumberland," which I have been engaged in reading during all my 
leisure hours since. 

I take great pleasure in complimenting you on the handsome style in 
which this work is printed and bound. It would do credit to any pub- 
lishing house in London. The subject-matter aleo is admirable, well ar- 
ranged, and well digested; the narrative clear and concise, sustained by a 
reasonable number of official documents. 

I notice your remark about the criticism on my own publication, and 
assure you that I object to no criticism whatever that tends to elicit the 
truth, and I will hail the publication of any work that treats of our civil 
war. I hope that the Armies of the Ohio, Tennessee, Gulf, etc., will all 
find as earnest advocates and historians as Swinton, for the Army of the 
Potomac, and Van Home, for the Army of the Cumberland. 

No one knows better than you the great variety of histories, sketches, 



32 GENERAL THOMAS. 



and memoirs which followed the battle of Waterloo. Even recently I 
have received one by Mr. Hooper, throwing new light on a battle fought 
sixty years ago. Our war covered a whole continent, and was a "civil" 
war, which of all others begets passions and prejudices of the most violent 
kind. It involved a dozen battles alnmst as important to us as Waterloo 
was to England, and assumed such a variety of phases that men may differ 
widely and yet be honest. I am assured by many who have read my 
Memoirs that they contain a high tribute to Gen. Thomas, for therein is 
recounted that we were school- fellows and associates in the army, and that 
it made little difference to us which commanded, provided the good cause 
prevailed. My Memoirs contain many allusions to him rather to illustrate 
his personal character, and the one wherein 1 attribute "slowness in at- 
tacking" was reported to me qfficiaUy by the highest authority, after the 
event. The same of McPherson, whom we all loved and admired. In 
recording the event about Resaca, I could not help stating, what he himself 
often did, that he there had the best opportunity ever offered to achieve 
for himself a brilliant success. I am sorry his friends think I did this 
from sinister motives. No general can achieve fame without some mis- 
haps, defeats, and mistakes.' No general can be a man without the acci- 
dents of manhood. Washington himself, the brightest character known 
to history, made mistakes and sustained reverses. I think Gen. Thomas 
one of the grandest characters in our history ; but even the sun may have 
spots without detracting from its perfect titness as the center of the system 
of the worlds. Truly your friend, 

W. T. Sherman, General. 
To Messrs. Eobeet Clarke & Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. 



CHAPTER YIII. 

GENERAL m'pHERSON. 
No slur cast upon that ofBcer. 

This chapter (viii, Review) is devoted to describing 
the movements before Daltou and Resaca. The plan 
of the attack at this point is well known, and its gen- 
eral features have not hitherto been disputed by any 
one so far as I know. The Memoirs relate that General 
McPherson was directed to pass through Snake Creek 
Gap and get into Johnston's rear near Resaca, and, if 
possible, capture the latter place before Johnston could re- 
inforce it. McPherson did pass through the gap, and some 
portion of his command reached the railroad, but finding 
a force stronger than he anticipated, he fell back to the gap 
and strengthened his position. The Memoirs say that in 
thus falling back McPherson " was a little timid." This is 
put forth by the reviewer as a slur by Sherman upon Mc- 
Pherson's courage. JSTo intelligent man would think of 
attaching to this statement any slur upon McPherson. 
The entire narrative bears evidence to contradict any such 
intent. Further on, the Memoirs say that McPherson was 
justified by his orders in doing just what he did do. Nothing 
could he plainer than this language. It is true, that of 
necessity, in a move of this description, upon which so much 
depended, much was left to MePherson's judgment; feeling 
the responsibility, he doubtless felt inclined to take as 
little risk as possible, and rather than imperil the whole, 
he took the safer course, which, though admitted to be 
within his orders, is described as timid, l^o greater praise 
could be bestowed upon McPherson than is bestowed upon 
him, as will be seen if the entire narrative is read. A young 
officer, with a brilliant reputation, having the confidence of 
his army and his superiors, is intrusted with the command 
of a movement which, if fully carried out by taking Resaca, 

(33) 



34 GENEEAL m'pHERSON. 

would have added largely to his fame as a soldier. He was 
fully alive to the importance of the occasion, and was am- 
bitious to accomplish all that was contemplated. When, 
however, he thought he had discovered a stronger force in 
his front than he had at first anticipated, he preferred to 
take the safer course of withdrawing to- the gap and 
strengthening his position there. It is within the writer's 
knowledge that he afterward keenly regretted his move- 
ment at this juncture, and that he then realized that he had 
missed a great opportunity, just such as the Memoirs say 
it was. I recommend to the intelligent reader who feels 
an interest in McPherson's fame (and who does not?) that 
he examine the Memoirs, and compare them with the state- 
ments made by the reviewer. This examination will con- 
vince him, that while the measure of success might have 
been more complete, yet there was no failure to be at- 
tributed to any one, nor is there slur cast upon McPherson's 
courage or conduct. 

The following letter from General Hickenlooper, then 
on General McPherson's staff, is evidence pertinent to this 
matter : 

Cincinnati, December 11, 1875. 
Col. a W. Moulton : 

Sik: In response to your communication in reference to General Mc- 
Pherson's movement on Kesaca, I have the honor to reply in detail accord- 
ing to my best recollection, from which you can extract and use such por- 
.tions as you may deem advisable. 

The Army of the Tennessee reached Yillanow, May 8th, during the 
afternoon of which day I accompanied our advance cavalry through Snake 
Creek Gap to the table-land beyond, and, much to our surprise, found the 
gap entirely unguarded and unobstructed. We could only hear of two 
rebel cavalrymen passing through an hour or two before, and from all we 
could learn of their movements, they evidently possessed no knowledge of 
our advance. 

On the following day, the army moved through the gap, our advance 
striking and defeating a brigade of cavalry at the dehouche near Sugar 
Valley P. O., followed by the defeat of a light brigade of infantry ; after 
which there was a considerable pause in the movement. I was sent for- 
ward by General McPherson to urge on the attack. I found General 
Sweeney, in command of the advance of the Sixteenth Corps, sitting upon 
a log by the roadside, taking matters very coolly. I informed him of the 
general's desire for an immediate advance, to which he paid but little at- 
tention. In a few minutes I again, more urgently, repeated the order. 



GENERAL m'pHERSON. 35 



and it not being responded to with the promptness I deemed necessary, I 
returned and reported the condition of affairs to General McPherson, who 
then came forward and personally directed the advance and deployment 
of troops to a point within about one mile of Resaca, where we occupied a 
low range of hills overlooking the valley of Camp creek. 

The Sixteenth Corps was then thrown well to the left, and pushed for- 
ward in the direction of the railroad, and toward the enemy's position 
above, which movement soon developed the enemy in considerable force, 
the commanding oflScer of the corps reporting more rebels on his front 
than he had troops in his own command. 

The river protecting Resaca from approach on the south, necessitated 
a direct attack from the west, in doing which the main road leading di- 
rectly south from the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, only twelve to 
fifteen miles distant, would be completely uncovered, and the left flank 
and rear exposed to an attack from that direction should the enemy feel 
disposed to take advantage of the opportunity. 

From all the indications then observable, I did not believe the enemy 
in front of General Dodge as numerous as represented, and, from the form 
of deployment of Confederate troops, felt that they, at that time, either 
underestimated our strength or anticipated only a strong cavalry raid. 

It was now late in the afternoon — 4 p. M. Much valuable time had 
been lost by General Sweeney's dilatory movements. Camp creek must 
be crossed, and a strongly fortified position b^eyond carried by assault, 
which rendered the capture of Resaca that afternoon a hopeless task. 

I did, however, then, and still think, that by a strong and vigorous 
movement — accepting some risk — the Sixteenth Corps, with its left pro- 
tected by the Fifteenth Corps, might have been pushed to the railroad 
above Resaca, and their line of communications temporarily obstructed, if 
not destroyed. 

But General Dodge's reported concentration of rebel troops on his 
left, which, as I have already described, was much exposed, together with 
a scout's report of rebel troops moving on the Dalton road, no doubt in- 
duced General McPherson to order the withdrawal of our army to a strong 
defensible position at the debouche of Snake Creek Gap. 

Respectfully, 

A. HiCKENLOOPER. 



CHAPTER IX. 

MERIDIAN. 
General "W. Sooy Smith's case. 

la this chapter (Review, p. 89), the reviewer attacks 
the Memoirs for injustice to General W. Sooy Smith, and 
for statements concerning the movement. He begins with 
quoting a statement of General Sherman that the plan was 
to penetrate eastward into the interior of Mississippi and 
break up the railroads, etc. 

The reviewer says that " much more than this was ex- 
pected at the !North, from preparations made and state- 
ments circulated;" and he goes on to state that "the gen- 
eral belief, was that the expedition was to penetrate as far 
east as Selma and turn upon Mobile." He produces no 
" records " to show who at the North it is that he refers to, 
or who it was that participated in the "general belief" of 
which he asserts so much, but proves nothing at all. It is 
not usual to plan military movements upon " expectations " 
of people far ofi' at the l!^orth or elsewhere, nor is it com- 
mon to consult " general belief" in arranging to execute 
such movements. 

Further along, the reviewer becomes more definite and 
states that the impression was current (that the move- 
ment was more extensive than Sherman intimates) at Gen- 
eral Grant's headquarters, at Washington. To prove this to 
be the fact, he produces an extract from a letter written by 
Grant to Halleck, in which Grant says, under date of Jan- 
uary 15th : 

" That he shall direct Sherman to move out to Meridian with his spare 
force — the cavalry going from Corinth, and destroy the railroads so effect- 
ually that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them during the rebellion. 
He will then return, unless the opportunity of going into Mobile with the 
force which he has appears perfectly plain." 

It is to be observed that the insinuation by the reviewer 
is, that the movement designed by Grant was upon Selma or 

(36) 



MERIDIAN. 



Mobile; and this letter is produced to prove that such was 
his design in contradiction of 81iermaii's statement that the 
movement was a raid to destroy the railroads. Grant's dis- 
patch to Thomas, of January 19 (Review, p. 89, 90), is in 
substance tlie same as the one to Halleck. Yet with this 
evidence before him, produced by himself, the reviewer 
asserts that Sherman states incorrectly the object of the 
movements. Grant's letter to Thomas states that the at- 
tempt to go to Mobile was to be undertaken only in the 
contingency that it was slightly guarded ; and yet this re- 
viewer says that the "general verdict of failure which met 
Sherman upon his return, called for prompt excuse, and the 
best at hand was found in the fact that the cavalry force 
from Memjihis under General W". Sooy Srg^ith had not 
reached Meridian as was intended." 

It is difficult to keep wnthin the terms of courteous 
discussion, when dealing with insinuations such as are 
made by the reviewer in this connection. He does not 
show b}^ any evidence \vhatever that General Grant, the 
officer who he says planned the movement, considered the 
expedition a failure. He furnishes no clue by which we 
can tell who pronounced the general verdict of failure, 
w^iich he says met Sherman upon his return, while all the 
evidence which he does produce, tends to prove that all 
was accomplished that was undertaken. In view of these 
circumstances, his assertion, that Sherman attempted to 
excuse himself from failure by casting blame upon Gen- 
eral Smith, is inexcusable. 

There is a charge in the Memoirs that Getieral Smith 
failed to execute that portion of the movement intrusted to 
him, and the evidence apparently sustains the charge. 

The Memoirs state that General Hurlbut's eftective 
cavalry force amounted to seven thousand ; that Smith 
had about twenty-five hundred in addition, which he had 
brought across from Middle Tennessee. This force, under 
General Smith, was to leave Memphis on the 1st of February, 
instead of which it was delayed eleven days. This delay, 
Sherman says, was unsatisfactory, in view of his instruc- 
tions ; he also says that his (Smith's) mode of returning to 



38 MERy)IAN. 



Memphis was not what he had expected, from a bold cav- 
alry raid. Sherman refers to his letter of instructions to 
Smith, as the evidence that the latter did not move as di- 
rected. The reviewer attempts to show, by circumstantial 
evidence, that Sherman agreed to tlie delay on account of . 
the non-arrival of one of the brigades of his (Smith's) com- 
mand. This evidence does not contradict the statement in 
the Memoirs, and it is not competent for that purpose, when 
there is better evidence at hand. The letter of instructions 
should settle this question, and the reviewer should have 
published it, together with all the papers bearing upon the 
question. The Memoirs state that the instructions were not 
obeyed. The reviewer says in effect, that this is not true. 
The way to settle the matter is to produce the instructions, 
which are on file in the War Department, and which the 
reviewer has evidently read, because he mentions them at 
p. 94. It is worse than idle to attempt to correct the 
Memoirs by records, and then omit to produce such records 
as must settle the controversy. 

The only excuse given for this omission is that " they 
are voluminous." This is not the way to "explain the Me- 
moirs in the light of the record." 

The statement is also made that General Smith has 
sought to relieve himself of the censure which was at the 
time cast upon him by reason of his failure in this move- 
ment, which he does not appear to have accomplished. 
This chapter therefore may fairly be considered to be his 
(Smith's) side of the case, and the evidence does not sat- 
isfactorily sustain his view of it, because it is not as full as 
is desirable. The entire record ought to be published, and 
the responsibility for the delay would then rest where.it 
belongs. 

It is perhaps to be regretted that General Smith did 
not cause all the documents relating to this (for him) un- 
fortunate matter to be made public long ago. Until that 
shall be done, readers are left to conjecture, and the failure 
to publish the instructions will not operate in his favor. 
Appended hereto is a letter addressed to General J. D. Web- 



MERIDIAN. 39 



eter, which will serve to explain the views of General Sher- 
man as to the best way to do justice to General Smith : 

General J. D. Webster, Chicago, III. ; 

Dear General: — General W. Sooy Smith feels aggrieved and wronged 
by my account of his part in the Meridian campaign in my Memoirs, Vol. 
I., pp. 389-394, and properly appeals to me for correction. I have offered 
to modify any words or form of expression that he may point out, but he 
asks me to completely change the whole that concerns him. This, of 
course, I will not do, as his part was material to the whole, and can not be 
omitted or materially altered without changing the remainder, for his 
failure to reach Meridian by February 10th was' the reason for other 
movements distant from him. 

I now oifer him what seems to me fair and liberal, that we submit the 
points at issue to you as arbitrator. You are familiar with the ground, the 
coincident history, and most, if not all, the parties. 

I propose to supply you with : 

1. Copy of my orders placing all the cavalry under General Smith's 
orders (with returns). 

2. My letter of instructions to him of January 27th. 

3. My official report of the campaign, dated Vicksburg, March 7, 1864. 

4. General W. Sooy Smith's report of his operations, dated Nashville, 
Tenn., March 4, 1864. 

After reading these, I further propose that you address us questions 
which we will answer in writing, when you are to make us a concise writ, 
ten decision, which I will have published in close connection with the subject 
in controversy. If General Smith will show you my letter to him of this 
date, and also deliver this with his written assent, I will promptly furnish 
you the above documents, and also procure from the official files a return 
of the cavalry force available at and near Memphis on the date of my 
orders, viz, January 27, 1864. With great respect, 

Your friend and servant, 

W. T. Sherman, General. 



CHAPTER X. 



The reviewer states in substance (p. 100) : 

1. That Sherman did not adopt the plan of pushing a 
force through Snake Creek Gap until seven days had 
elapsed after the attack was commenced. 

2. That Thomas recommended this movement in Feb- 
ruary preceding. 

3. That Sherman only adopted it after his failure by 
a front attack, and the delay of seven days enabled the 
enemy to retreat on his own lines, instead of being dis- 
persed, with his communications interrupted. 

The dispatclies from Sherman to Grant (at p. 102 of 
the Review), of May 1st and 4th, contradict the seassertions. 
The first dispatch is from Chattanooga, in which he states : 
" McPherson moves to Yillanow, Thomas to Tunnel Hill, 
Schofield to Catoosa Springs." The dispatch of the 4th 
confirms that of the 1st. When the reader examines the 
relative position of these three points, and understands the 
position of the rebels and their line of supplies, he com- 
prehends the plan of the movements without the slightest 
difficulty, and the reviewer's attempt to show that the 
movement upon Resaca, by McPherson, was an after- 
thought, falls to the ground without a struggle. 

That the general features of the campaign were agreed 
upon between Sherman and Thomas and the other officers 
in command in this campaign, has never been seriously 
disputed. It must be borne in mind, however, that the 
objective was not Resaca, Dalton, nor Atlanta, but John- 
ston's army. This being the case, the movements upon 
various places spoken of are to be understood as subord- 
inate to the main purpose, which was to draw Johnston 
into favorable positions and fight him, wherever that could 
be accomplished. 

The extract from Thomas' report shows that he sug- 

(40) 



EESACA. 41 



gested that the Army of the Ohio and the Tennessee should 
.demonstrate upon Daltou in front, while he, with the 
Array of the Cumberland, would pass through Snake Creek 
Gap and destroy Johnston's communications. He also re- 
lates that the Army of the Tennessee was sent through 
Snake Creek Gap to accomplish what he proposed to do 
with the Army of the Cumberland ; but the Army of the 
Tennessee not reaching Snake Creek Gap before the 
enemy had informed himself of the movement, was unable 
to get upon his communications before the enemy had re- 
inforced Eesaca. From the foregoing, it appears that the 
plan of passing through Snake Creek Gap was discussed 
in February between Grant and Thomas, and that the same 
plan was suggested to Sherman by Thomas, upon the latter's 
succeeding Grant in command. 

Thomas says that " Sherman objected to this plan for 
the reason that he desired my army to form the reserve of 
the united armies, and to serve as a rallying point for the 
two wings — the Army of the Ohio and that of the Ten- 
nessee — to operate from." 

From this language it is perfectly plain that what 
Sherman objected to was the suggestion that Thomas, in- 
stead of McPherson, should move through Snake Creek 
Gap, and that the movement through the gap was a part 
of the general plan agreed to by all and objected to by 
noue.^ 

The impression conveyed by the concluding extract 
from Thomas' report (at p. 101), is that McPherson's army 
did not succeed in reaching the enemy's lines before the 
withdrawal of Johnston from Dalton to Resaca. Subse- 
quent events show that the reinforcements of Resaca did not 
arrive until after the Army of the Tennessee had passed the 

^ The plan was for McPherson to make the lodgment on the railroad 
at or near Eesaca. The rest of the army encifcling Dalton was, on the 
confusion sure to result (from this lodgment), to fall on all parts of John- 
ston's army after it had let go its intrenchments. 

This being the plan, the propriety of retaining the main body of the 
army in front of Dalton becomes apparent. 



42 RESACA. 



gap, aud had actually reached the raih'oad between Dalton 
and that place. 

The attempt, by the reviewer, to show that Sherman 
contradicts himself, when he says he feigned on John- 
ston's front at Buzzard's Roost (i. e. Dalton) to attack 
in force through Snake Creek Gap, is not sustained by 
the records nor by the facts. The skill of the maneu- 
vers, by which Johnston was forced to retreat from Dal- 
ton and Resaca across the Oustenaula river, consisted 
in Sherman's being able to threaten the destruction of 
his communications. To do this, his front must be so 
employed that he could not repel the flank movement 
upon his lines. This movement to Resaca was intended 
either to break up Johnston's line of supplies, or to seize 
and hold a position by which the entire force could be 
thrown upon his flank. Failing to destroy the line, 
McPherson seized and held the position by which the 
attack in force could be made through the gap. Had 
Resaca been taken by him, the rebel army would probably 
have been dispersed, and Thomas aud Schofield were held 
in readiness to fall upon it in that condition. The Confed- 
erate Gen. Johnston's account of the movement shows how 
effectually he was misled by Sherman.^ 



Johnston's narrative, p. 304 et seq. 



CHAPTER XI. 

KENESAW. 

The reviewer's criticisms illustrated. 

The observations relating to the assault made in this 
chapter would be scarcely worthy of attention, were it not 
for one or two points attempted to be made by the re- 
viewer. "When Sherman, at the head of a victorious army, 
with only a single line of railroad to transport his sup- 
plies, found himself confronted by the rebels in an in- 
trenched position, he had to adopt one of three plans, if 
he wished to make any further progress. One was to 
abandon his line of railroad and attack by the flank ; an- 
other to make the attack by regular approaches; while 
the third would be to assault the works. An assault was 
determined upon. 

The reviewer says : " That, by the almost universal 
verdict along the lines, it was adjudged a needless move, 
and so an inexcusable slaughter." ^ The reviewer was, I be- 
lieve, an officer with the Army of the Cumberland, and his 
opportunties to know the facts accurately are ample; hence 
his statement as to the verdict of that army ought to be 
true. This statement of his, he attempts to confirm by 
the dispatches from the commanding officers of that army. 
He also states, as if by authority, that General Scholield 
opposed the assault. If these statements are true (and I 
am not able to contradict them), they w^ould serve to ex- 
plain why the assault failed. An assault, undertaken by 
an army that had already decided that it was needless, 
would not be very likely to be successful. 

The suggestion of the reviewer that these armies un- 

1 One of the soldiers, who was at the extreme front in this assault, and 
who afterward measured the distance to the enemy's works from our lines, 
saj's that the first intimation that there had been an inexcusable slaughter 
was obtained from the Cincinnati Gazeiie, a few days after the occurrence. 

(43) 



44 KENE^W. 



dertook to express their opinions by a verdict of the neces- 
sity of any move directed by the commanding officer, is 
hardly worth a place in military criticism, and should be 
dismissed as a sensational paragraph written after the fact 
for newspaper circulation. 

It reminds me of the anecdote of one of the new regi- 
ments, which found itself during the war stationed not a 
thousand miles from CiDcinnati. 

It had just succeeded in obtaining comfortable quarters, 
and officers and men felt like taking matters easy. About 
this time, an urgent order reached them to go to some other 
point on the line. This was not satisfactory, and a meeting 
was at once organized to discuss the question of going. 
I never learnt what the verdict was, but I presume the 
order was obeyed. 

Judging from his statements, if the reviewer had been 
in chief command, in place of Sherman, he would not have 
made many powerful efforts to fight, but would have pre- 
ferred to adopt the maxim that — 

" He who fights not, but runs away, 
May live to fight another day." 

There is one observation made (at p. 116), which 1 
think is probably correct. Sherman observes that " Thomas, 
as usual, shook his head," when some proposition about a 
movement was made to him, and the reviewer says that 
Thomas could not have shaken his head through the 
medium of the cipher and the telegraphic wires. In this, 
I agree with him ; and if General Sherman meant that such 
was his (Thomas') usual manner of shaking his head, he is 
probably mistaken ; nevertheless, it is possible that Sher- 
man's statement is true, and that Thomas did shake his 
head in some other way than by means of the wire and the 
cipher. 



Since the above was given to the printer, two able 
articles have appeared in the Nation, of November 25th 
and December 2d. Their author's ideas on this topic are 
so apropos and well expressed, that they are inserted here : 



KENESAW. 45 



"The chapter on the assault upon Konesaw, which is called 'an inex- 
cusable slaughter,' might be dismissed with the single remark that in war 
very few apologies are necessary for a bold attack upon a wooded position 
whose strength can not be known till you try it. Otherwise, Grant would 
be culpable for such attacks as that upon Missionary Ridge and Lookout 
Mountain, where the element of boldness in his movement now rightly 
gives him the chief glory of it. State the case thus: Sherman, with about 
a hundred thousand men, found himself in front of a weaker enemy, hold- 
ing a line of high wooded hills. His line of communications is a single 
railroad in his rear several hundred miles long, which is kept fully busy in 
supplying him from day to day in a country which affords nothing for the 
subsistence of his army. To turn the position involves the abandonment 
of his communications, and the taking of all the chances that his supplies 
would utterly fail, while the miry roads of the country were almost im- 
passable. Shall he take the latter course without trying an attack on the 
position ? We are sure every impartial military critic will say he must try 
the attack. Take another step. If he makes the attack with about eighty 
thousand men, and has a list of casualties of about two thousand five hun- 
dred killed and wounded as the result, is that by military rules to be re- 
garded as 'an inexcusable slaughter?' The answer must certainly be, No. 
Once more, considering again the attacking force and their losses, was 
there or was there not good ground for Sherman's saying that 'one-fourth 
more vigor, mathematically,' would have ' put the head of George Thomas' 
whole army right through Johnston's deployed line,' when Thomas-reported 
his columns as a])le to hold their ground ' within sixty yards of the enemy's 
entrenchments ?' It surely can not be regarded as extravagant. Still 
again, when after such a proportion of casualties to the numbers attacking. 
General Thomas says (p. 114), ' One or two more such assaults would use up 
this army,' and can only suggest an approach of the enemy's field-works 
' by regular saps,' does he exhibit such ideal energy that Sherman must be 
thought 'cruelly unjust' if he intimates that solid old Thomas was some- 
times a trifle slow ?" 



CHAPTER XII. 

POLITICAL GENERALS. 
The successor to McPherson. 

The reviewer seems to confess his inability to belittle 
tbe brilliant maneuvers which ended in the capture of At- 
lanta, but he finds an opportunity to arraign General Sher- 
man for calling one or two prominent officers " political " 
generals, and yet there appears to be a doubt in his own 
mind whether or not the explanation given by Sherman of 
his meaning of this term does not import that it was prefer- 
able to that which he attached to the term "professional" 
soldier.^ It is no disrespect to either of the officers named 
to assume that they did look upon personal glory won in 
the army as secondary to their political ambition. I think 
it may. be justly said of most of our volunteer officers, that 
personal glory was a secondary consideration with them. 
I hope none of them will feel aggrieved if this is the judg- 
ment which history awards to them ; it will remain as their 
best title to the regard in which posterity will ever hold 
them. 

Sherman doubtless felt greater reliance upon regu- 
larly educated officers than he did upon those who were 
not thus trained to the service ; whether he was right or 
wrong in this opinion, I do not wish to discuss ; but in 
stating his own motives for his actions at this critical junc- 
ture, it is both right and proper for him to state them cor- 
rectly ; he was responsible if the movements failed, and it 
was his duty to act upon his own judgment. He now gives 
his reason for his action upon that occasion. Having given 

1 1 regarded both generals ... as volunteers that looked to per- 
sonal fame and glory as auxiliary and secondary to their political ambi- 
tions, and not as professional soldiers." Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 86. 
(46) 



POLITICAL GENERALS. 47 

them there is no occasion for the statement that the term 
political as applied to these officers, implied anything like 
a sneer at their conduct, upon this or any other occasion. 
Elsewhere he speaks in high terms of praise of both of 
them. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 
The plan as executed was Sherman's. 

Did Sherman originate the march to the sea? The 
reviewer devotes thirty odd pages of his book in attempting 
to show that Sherman was not the author of this move- 
ment, incidentally attempting to show that Grant was the 
author of it. 

To the ordinary reader, the reasons why this attempt is 
made are not apparent. It is be3'0nd dispute that the 
movement was executed by Sherman in a manner satisfac- 
tory to General Grant and to the country. 

Sherman says that he planned it, President Lincoln 
confirms the statement, and Grant has never disputed it. 
I shall not attempt to follow the reviewer's assertions in 
detail ; but the statement of a few admitted facts will, I 
think, clear up the dispute. 

The capture of Atlanta completed a series of maneuvers 
which were begun with Johnston's array as the " main ob- 
jective;" that army now commanded by Hood was still in 
existence — weakened it is true, yet still capable of much 
mischief. As Atlanta was not the main objective of the 
campaign, it was no part of the plan to sit down there, 
as if the campaign had been closed by taking and hold- 
ing it. But the question was what was to be the next 
move? A march to the sea, says the reviewer, had been 
contemplated by General Grant while he was in com- 
mand at Nashville, and a mass of dispatches are produced 
tending to prove that he and other officers had such a move 
in their minds, and that many suggestions were made as to 
the manner of accomplishing it, all of which may be admit- 
ted to be true, and yet they do not contradict the statements 
of the Memoirs. 

These dispatches indicate a plan of dividing the Con- 

(48) 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 49 

federacy, etist and west, from the interior to the sea-board. 
The point most strongly indicated on the coast is Mobile, 
but any other point would have served as good a purpose; 
but each and all of these suggestions or plans contemplate 
interior lines, to be occupied and guarded from the starting 
point to the sea. 

Without attempting to criticise these suggestions it is 
sufficient to observe that this was not the plan adopted and 
executed by Sherman in his march. The movements of his 
armies after the fall of Atlanta depended upon the course 
pursued by Hood. If that officer remained about Atlanta, 
ready to fall upon the moving column at its exposed points, 
then an attempt to shift position and establish a new base 
upon the coast would have been daugerous and difficult. 
Hood saw fit to move toward ISTashville, evidently intend- 
ing to fall upon Sherman's lines. As soon as this move- 
ment was known, the march to the sea became a definite 
plan, and was executed. Neither Sherman nor any other 
commander planned this movement, as executed, before 
Hood's movements became known. 

The appended dispatches will, I think, serve to con- 
vince the reader that all the records published by the re- 
viewer do not affect the claim, made in the Memoirs, that 
Sherman planned the march as carried out after the fall of 
Atlanta. 

. . " It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through 
to the coast with a garrison left on the southern railroads leading east and 
west through Georgia to effectually sever the east from the west. . . 
Grant s final report, July 22, 18G5. 



Washington, Dec. 26, 1864. 
To General Sherman : 

. . When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I felt 
anxious and fearful. . . Now the undertaking being a success, the 
honor is all yours, for none of us went further than to acquiesce. . . 

A. Lincoln. 



Sherman to Halleck. 
In the field, near Atlanta, August 13, 1864. 
. . If I should ever be cut off from my base, look out for me about St. 
Marks, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia. .' . W. T. Sherman. 



50 THE MARClT :^0 THE SEA. 

Shekman to Halleck. 

October IG, 1864. 
. . I got the dispatch in cipher about providing me a place to come 
out on salt water, but the cipher is imperfect, and I can not make out 
■whether Savannah or Mobile be preferred, but I also want to know if you 
are willing I should destroy Atlanta and the railroad. . . 

W. T. Sherman. 



Sherman to Halleck. 

October 19, 1864. 
. . I now consider myself authorized to execute my plan to destroy 
the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city [modi- 
fied by General Grant from Dalton, etc.], strike out into the heart of 
Georgia, and make for Charleston, Savannah, or the mouth of the Appa- 
lachicola. ... W. T. Sherman. 



Sherman to Grant. 

October 22, 1864. 

• • I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force 
able to hold the line of the Tennessee, whilst I break up tlie railroad in 
front of Dalton, including the city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia, 
break up its railroads, etc. . . . 

. I think that far better than defending a long line of railroad. . . 

W. T. Sherman. 



City Point, Va., Nov. 2, 1864. 
Major General Sherman : 

. . I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow 
Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say then go 
on as you propose. U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant-General. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

iiardee's escape. 

The reviewer commences an account of Hardee's es- 
cape from Savannah, with a preamble evidently intended 
to show that Thomas was left behind with an insufficient 
force, with only one chance of success, which was to re- 
treat, seemingly forgetting that Thomas had said, in sub- 
stance, on the 12th of November (ante, p. 29), that he had 
troops enough to follow Beauregard (Hood) and ruin him, 
and that it was not until Sherman received this assurance that 
he cut loose and started for the sea (Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 169). 
When these dates and circumstances are brought into view 
the attempt to siiow that Sherman left Thomas with an 
insufficient force (even that Thomas thought he was doing 
so), partakes of that class of misrepresentation which 
should be denounced as fraudulent. There can be no 
mistake about the views of General Thomas as to his 
knowledge of all the facts when he expressed his ability 
to follow Beauregard (Hood). The Memoirs say "that 
General Thomas was naturally anxious because he saw 
that on him would be likely to fall the real blow." Vol. 2, 
p. 169. 

So it was -the fact that General Thomas saw that he had 
all of Hood's army to contend with, and that the real blow 
was to fall on him, and he made no objection to Sherman's 
moving away from him, but expressed his opinion that he 
was able to take the offensive. Yet the reviewer says that 
he had only one chance to save himself, that chance was 
to "fall back slowly." That Thomas was wise in falling 
back to Nashville before giving battle, I neither affirm nor 
deny — but it is evident that he did not, on the 12th of 
November, consider that " falling back his only chance of 
success." That i^vident from his dispatch to Sherman. 
The strategy of r^^ating is now put forth by the reviewer 
to adorn his paragraph for general circulation. As a mili- 

(51) 



52 haedee's escape. 



tary criticism upon the movement, it has no authority ex- 
cept the reviewer, and he is not supported by Thomas him- 
self. 

The reviewer leaves this subject and takes up Hardee's 
escape from Savannah. The key-note of his comments is 
the dispatch from Mr. Stanton to General Grant, at p. 165, 
in which the Secretary says " that it was a sore disappoint- 
ment that Hardee was able to get off with fifteen thousand 
men from Sherman's sixty thousand." 

Sherman expressed himself as disappointed with the 
escape of the rebels, and it is possible that it might have 
been prevented. In estimating the responsibility of a mil- 
itary officer for permitting an enemy to escape, there are 
many considerations to be taken into the account. In the 
present instance, it is to be remembered that the ground 
occupied by our forces about Savannah was low and flat, 
nearly on a level with the sea, and that it was more or 
less submerged at the time. Further, that our ofiicers were 
almost wholly unacquainted with the means of egress and 
ingress to and from the city. Under such circumstances, 
it is scarcely to be expected that every avenue of escape 
could be securely guarded ; nor is it a matter of surprise 
that the commanding officer found that he was mistaken 
in supposing that he had made the investment complete; 
nor should it be overlooked that a small force under an 
active commander like Hardee could escape under such cir- 
cumstances more easily than a larger one. Most readers 
will agree with the statement in the Memoirs, "that on the 
whole we had reason to be content with the substantial 
fruits of victory." Future history will doubtless place a 
correct estimate upon Sherman's operations at Savannah, 
and he should be content with its verdict when the facts 
are stated. It is possible that if the reviewer had been in 
command he could have done better than Sherman did, but 
as he was not in command, the public will have to be satis- 
fied with accepting his judgment of what " might have 
been done." 



CHAPTER XV. 

CAPTURED COTTON. 

In commenting upon the captured cotton at Savannah, 
the reviewer endeavors to convict the Memoirs of misrepre- 
sentations relating to its transfer from the Quartermaster's 
Department to the Treasury Agents. 

It has come to be tolerably well understood that almost 
anything can be proved that is desired in the cotton claims, 
which have been prosecuted against the government since 
the close of the war. 

It is perhaps useless at this time to make an attempt to 
ascertain who it is that is responsible for the mannerin which 
this branch of the public business has been managed. 
That the result of litigation which has grown out of these 
captures has been adverse to the government is notorious; 
that hundreds of thousands of dollars have been recovered 
by claimants by means of various pretenses, which ought 
not to have been allowed to prevail, is equally well known ; 
that enormous frauds have been perpetrated upon the Treas- 
ury Department, in connection with claims for captured 
cotton, will not be seriously disputed. Officers of the army 
were generally of the opinion that the management of 
the business by treasury agents was such as to make these 
frauds possible, and that large sums of money would have 
been saved if there had been less haste in turning the cot- 
ton over to those agents. 

Looking at the results which have been reached, it is 
difficult to say that they are not right. General Sherman, 
no doubt, preferred to have the Savannah cotton retained 
under the control of the officers of the Quartermaster's De- 
partment, whose integrity and capacity he had tested, rather 
than that it should be manipulated by civilians. He 
may have been wrong in this preference, but the results 
of the business do not justify especial boasting on the part 
of those who were intrusted with it. 

(53) 



54 CAPTUEED ^OTTON. 

The substance of the statement in the Memoirs is " that 
up to January 12, 1865, all the cotton had been carefully 
guarded with orders to send it to Kew York for adjudica- 
tion in the nearest prize court, accompanied with invoices 
and all evidence of title ; marks, numbers, and figures 
were carefully preserved on the bales, so that the court 
might know the history of each bale. Mr. Stanton changed 
all this, and ordered the obliteration of all marks." This 
proceeding General Sherman thought strange at the time. 

The reviewer here volunteers a legal opinion, that cot- 
ton thus shipped would not fall within the jurisdiction of a 
prize court; but he fails to tell us why it would not, and it 
is puzzling to know why litigation relating to captured 
prizes of war would not fall within the jurisdiction of a 
prize court of the conqueror. The reviewer may know 
more about the law of cotton claims than General Sherman 
did ; but, if he does, he does not exhibit it very clearly in 
this paragraph. 

Yet his knowledge is apparently so extensive that he 
is entitled to the benefit of a presumption, that he does 
know that " cotton captured in war is not within the juris- 
diction of a prize court." After the exhibition of so much 
legal learning by him, it is perhaps dangerous to pursue the 
discussion. Inasmuch, however, as he says nothing further 
on the subject of the jurisdiction of courts, but returns to 
his allegation of facts, we will venture to see what he 
states. He says that Sherman's charge, that the marks were 
obliterated from the bales, is not true. 

To prove this, he introduces — 

1. The order of the Secretary, directing the Quarter- 
master-General to assume charge of the cotton and transfer 
it to the Treasury agents. 

2. The order of the Quartermaster-General regulating 
the manner of the transfer. 

3. An agreement between the officers of the Quarter- 
master's Department and the Treasury Department, relat- 
ing to the transfer. 

There is not in either of these documents any order or 
stipulation that the marks and numbers should be preserved 



CAPTURED COTTON. 55 

on the bales. So far, then, there is not a particle of proof 
that Sherman's statement that these marks were being 
obliterated is untrue. It is, however, stated that Simeon 
Draper, one of the Treasury cotton agents, had instructions 
from the Secretary of the Treasury to preserve these marks. 
At p. 203, the reviewer gives what he says are the regula- 
tions to that eif'ect. 

The attention of the reader is invited to these regula- 
tions, when he will see that no provision is made for pre- 
serving the marks on the bales. 

The regulations say that the marks and numbers must 
be carefully recorded; but not a word is said about pre- 
serving or retaining the marks on the bales — the very thing 
which Sherman says he had been careful to have preserved, 
and it was probably this record that was to be kept by the 
agents, and the absence of the bales, with the marks upon 
them, that has made it so easy to get a cotton claim through 
by those who understood this carefully made record.. Be 
that as it may, the ignorance or malice of the reviewer, who 
boldly asserts that Sherman's statement is contradicted by 
these regulations and orders, surpasses any thing that he 
has before attempted. We must charitably conclude that 
he does not know the difference between preserving a record 
of the marks, and the preservation of the marks them- 
selves. 

It is gratifying to be informed, as we are (at p. 204), 
that the officers charged with these cotton transactions, 
employed a force of citizen clerks, who had long been in 
cotton business at Savannah, to preserve these records for 
future identification of this cotton. It would be curious to 
trace these records thus made into the court of claims, 
and ascertain how many of these " able and experienced 
clerks" furnished information from the memoranda thus ob- 
tained, which enabled the claimants to obtain judgments 
against the government. It seems from the Memoirs, that 
Sherman was informed that the total number of bales cap- 
tured was thirty-one thousand, and upon this information, 
he says that the claims already allowed exceed the total 
number reported captured. From the statement in the Re- 



56 CAPTUEED. COTTON. 

view it appears that the total number of bales was thirty- 
iiiue thousand three hundred and tiftj -eight, and that the 
total number allowed, and for which suits are pending, is 
thirty-six thousand five hundred and fifty-eight, leaving 
two thousand eight hundred yet unclaimed. It may be 
that Sherman was misinformed as to the quantity captured 
and shipped, and hence this error in his calculations. He 
was evidently attempting to illustrate the peculiar manner 
in which the cotton business was managed. 

The discriminating reader will reach the conclusion 
that he has furnished the clue to the reason why judgments 
for so much of the rebel cotton have been recovered in the 
court of claims. The preserved records enabled claimants 
to complete the necessary evidence. Whereas, if the cotton 
had been shipped to New York, as Sherman directed, and 
the parties required to litigate their rights to it, in the usual 
mode of proceeding, before the bales were destroyed, and 
while all the facts were fresh in the memory of witnesses, 
and before there was time to manufacture evidence, it is 
probable that the government would have saved a large 
proportion of it. As it has been managed, it appears that 
the proceeds amounted to seven and a quarter millions of 
dollars, and that this has all been paid back, with the ex- 
ception of a trifle over a half million — hardly enough to 
pay the costs of the litigation. 

The fact that Sherman's order No. 10, January 12, 
1864, directed General Easton, of the Quartermaster's De- 
partment, to turn over the cotton in gross, is commented 
upon in such a manner as to leave the impression that it 
contradicts the Memoirs. This is not the case. The explana- 
tion is this : When Sherman learned that General Easton 
was not to ship the cotton, but that, under the direction of 
the Secretary of War, it was to go to the Treasury agents, he 
knew that it thereby became uncecessary for General 
Easton to take it up on his property accounts, and account 
to the auditor of the Treasury Depa-tment in detail. Had 
General Eaaton shipped the cotton and sold it, it would 
have been his duty to have kept the account in detail, and 
rendered a return of it in the forms prescribed by the reg- 



CAPTURED COTTON. 57 

ulations. Inasmuch as he was not permitted to make this 
disposition of it, it became his duty to turn it over in gross 
— just as the order directs. To have attempted to have 
done otherwise would have interfered with the orders of 
the Secretary and of the Quartermaster-General already re- 
ferred to, all of which is apparent upon the face of the 
orders themselves. (See Eeview, pp. 200-202.) Noth- 
ing but ignorance of the subject he was discussing, can 
excuse the reviewer for insinuating that a receipt in gross 
tends, in the slightest degree, to confuse the record, or de- 
stroy the marks on the bales. 

This is on a par with this reviewer's assertion that a 
regulation which ordered a record of the marks on the 
bales preserved, was the same as preserving the marks and 
bales themselves. The facts presented in the records in 
this chapter are quite sufficient to show the totally unre- 
liable character of what the reviewer has said. 



CHAPTER XYI. 

BENTONVILLE. 

The reviewer devotes several pa^es to criticising the 
disposition of General Sherman's army in its march north- 
ward, and he overflows, so to speak, with charges of 
carelessness as to the relative position of the various 
corps and divisions. It is true that he attempts to state 
the relative positions of the various columns, but whether 
these positions are the best that could be obtained or 
not, he omits to state. He does not pretend that the 
Memoirs misrepresent what occurred, and there is no at- 
tempt to contradict any of the statements made by Sher- 
man which relate to this battle. He says that the col- 
umns were too far apart to be within easy supporting dis- 
tance of each other. He does not show that the topography 
of the country or its roads were such as to admit of their 
being nearer together. He fails to show that the moving 
column which was attacked was unable to repulse the 
enemy brought against it. The facts are, that although an 
attack was made, it was unsuccessful. The reviewer at- 
tempts to explain that a portion of the army was at one 
time in great danger. The answer might be, that if this 
were so, it escaped with very small loss. The history of 
this afiair, as well as the result of the operations, show that 
there was no such danger. Sherman's army at that time 
was en route for Richmond, and there was no disposition to 
be drawn aside by minor considerations. It is also probable 
that Sherman's army was not so afraid of danger as the 
reviewer evidently thinks they should have been under the 
circumstances. 

In marching through a strange country, where the 
roads are unfamiliar to the army, it will frequently happen 
that the moving columns will become separated to a greater 
distance than is desirable, and it is possible that something 
of this kind happened to this army, not only upon this 

(58) 



BENTONVILLE. 59. 



occasion, but upon several occasions ; but the general results 
show that it marched a greater distance with less loss of men 
or equipments than any other army organized during the 
war. It is probable that no army of modern times, in any 
country, ever performed their work better, or with more 
promptness and exactness, than was displayed by Sherman's 
army in this extraordinary march from Chattanooga to 
Washington. It was admitted at the time that the work 
was well done, and the thanks of the nation were freely ten- 
dered to them. The attempt now to show that it amounted 
to but little, and was carelessly planned or executed, ought 
to be branded as unjust and untruthful by every officer and 
soldier w^ho remembers it. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 

When the reviewer reached that portion of the Memoirs 
in which the transactions with Johnson are narrated, he 
evidently felt the inspiration which has always manifested 
itself whenever this agreement has been discussed by news- 
paper correspondents. I do not agree with some of his 
critics, that he devoted too much space to this topic. It is 
an interesting subject — one which can be taken up after a 
lapse of ten years and studied with interest and profit. 
The reviewer says that Sherman has given an inaccurate 
history of. the negotiations, whereupon he proceeds to ex- 
pose the inaccuracies, producing several valuable historical 
documents for which he would be entitled to great credit 
if they supported his allegation. Inasmuch as the reviewer 
has devoted forty pages to reviewing the terms of the 
agreement, he ought not cavil at Sherman for devoting 
thirty pages of his narrative in relating a history of it. 

These pages of his have been examined by me, and while 
I find much in them criticising the agreement and Sherman's 
conduct in reference to it, I fail to find that the reviewer has 
pointed out the inaccuracies which he charges at the com- 
mencement of his chapter. There may be some minor errors 
in the Memoirs — such errors frequently occur in narrative^ 
of all transactions — ^but the reviewer himself appears to 
have forgotten to point them out. He gives his own views 
of the agreement, and he furnishes many documents of 
value, but these documents sustain the statements in the 
Memoirs in almost every particular. Any one who reads 
them and compares them with the Memoirs, will be sur- 
prised that Sherman's recollection was so accurate as to all 
the leading facts. 

The reviewer says that the " real character of the terms 
were carefully concealed." He adduces no proof of this, 
and there are no circumstances to support his assertion ; 

(60) 



THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 61 

but suppose it were true, was it not proper they should be 
concealed? In its nature it was a confidential document, 
which bound neither party, and was of no permanent val- 
idity until ratified by the civil authority. It was drawn up 
to be submitted — it was sent to the proper ofiicial for ap- 
proval or rejection, and until such proper authority had 
acted upon it, it was the duty of the commanding officer 
not to divulge its terms. 

In his narrative, Sherman says that he talked the sub- 
ject of the surrender over with his leading officers, and 
all the general features of the agreement were discussed. 
Sherman was doubtless the proper judge as to how far its 
particular stipulations should be disclosed. The precise 
bearing of the reviewer's observation to the effect that Sher- 
man's position would have been made very uncomfortable if 
it had been known that a member of the rebel Cabinet had 
written the first draft of it is not preceptible. I fail to 
understand why he lays so much stress upon the writing 
of the first draft. The agreement as executed was drawn up 
b}^ Sherman, and the copy of Reagan, the rebel cabinet officer 
referred to, differs from it in a number of details. The ev- 
idence shows that Reagan's copy was rejected, and that 
Sherman made a draft which suited himself. 

Sherman states all this in his narrative. The confed- 
erate General Johnston, in his narrative, makes a similar 
statement, and adds that Sherman wrote so rapidly that 
he thought he must have come prepared to make the 
draft. Sherman and Johnston both agree that the terms 
of the agreement had been settled upon between them 
before Reagan took part in the business. Johnston says that 
Reagan only wrote down what had been agreed to, with 
the exception of the amnesty clause. The evidence is there- 
fore conclusive that the paper which was executed was the 
work of Sherman, and that Reagan's draft was not used. 

It is to be regretted that the records of the TVar De- 
partment have not been searched, with a view to ascer- 
tain if possible the cause of the uproar in the newspapers 
which followed the publication of this agreement. jSTot 
only was the agreement itself attacked by them, but 



62 THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 

• 

Sherman was made the subject of the most outrageous iusnlts 
throughout the entire iN'orth. He was almost branded as a 
traitor. The excitement was nearly as high as it was when 
Fort Sumpter was fired upon. 

There must have been some cause for this outside of 
the agreement itself, and we shall not probably ascertain 
what that cause was, until all the war office records are 
published. If that is ever done, the facts will, I presume, 
be disclosed, which will explain the matter. 

There is nothing in the terms of the agreement to create 
such a storm of abuse as it seemed to produce. But even 
if there had been, there was no occasion for alarm; it 
bound no one, and made no pretense of doing so ; there was 
nothing in the relative positions of Sherman and Stan- 
ton, that made it improper in the former to present it to 
the latter. 

If the paper was as bad as the newspapers claimed it 
to be, the utmost that Sherman was chargeable with, was 
that he gave to the authorities at Washington an oppor- 
tunity to make a disadvantageous agreement with the 
rebels. If they had availed themselves of the opportunity, 
and concluded such an agreement, Sherman might have 
been blamed for submitting it to them. Inasmuch, how- 
ever, as the agreement was rejected, and the statu quo of 
the army was restored, without any loss, there was no occa- 
sion for excitemeut. 

As above observed the causes for this excitement must 
be sought for elsewhere than in the agreement. 

The reviewer furnishes us with a clue, I think, to the 
causes of the extraordinary course which was pursued to- 
ward General Sherman. He says : 

" General Sherman was elated almost beyond measure at his march to 
the sea and northward through the Carolinas." 

" General Grant had captured the great army of the Confederacy ; all 
the rest must follow as a matter of course. Sherman was not in at the 
death, the war was to close with General Grant as its greatest military 
hero. 

Then came the proposal for a conference with Johnston, while first 
writing to Johnston that he would extend th« same terms given by Grant 
to Lee, and immediately writing General Grant that, he would be careful 



THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 63 

not to complicate any point of civil policy, yet doubtless influenced by his 
own reflections upon the secondary part in which events were leaving him, 
and by the cunning manipulations of the rebel cabinet, he conceived the 
idea not only of receiving the surrender of the remaining military forces 
of the rebellion, and of declaring peace from the Potomac to the Kio 
Grande, but of becoming the political reconstructor of the nation, and thus 
the most prominent character emerging from the war." — Review, pp. 220, 
221. 

Especial attention is invited to the foregoing extracts, 
because they are believed to represent the opinions of those 
in authority at Washington, who sought to destroy Sher- 
man at the time the Johnston agreement was proposed. 
The substance of the statement is that Sherman desired to 
have the war closed by the surrender of all the rebel forces. 
The surrender of all the remaining forces of the rebellion 
was the substance of the agreement.^ This was sent in the 
usual ;manner to the proper authority for consideration. 
Because Sherman received this proposal and recommended 
its adoption, he was denounced as a traitor. And now ten 
years after the event, the reasons why he was thus de- 
nounced, are dimly shadowed in the extract quoted above, 
the substance of which is that if the surrender of all the 
remaining rebel forces was received by him, he would be 
likely to be " the most prominent character emerging from 
the war." This amounts to an admission that the surrender 
must be refused, in order to prevent Sherman from becom- 
ing " the most prominent character emerging from the 
war." 

This is not the place to discuss the terms of the agree- 
ment, but such motives for its rejection as are here inti- 
mated are absolutely wicked. It was of comparatively little 
consequence who became " the most prominent character 
emerging from the war," but it was of the utmost impor- 
tance to end the war without further waste of life or 
property. 

The cause of complaint by. General Sherman at the 

1 The forces to be surrendered consisted of Johnson's own army; that 
of Dick Taylor, in Louisiana and Texas; the armies under Generals 
Maury, Forest, and others in Alabama. 



64 THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 

course the "War Department pursued with reference to this 
agreement, was that it was pubUshed in the newspapers 
with the instructions given to General Grant, of March 3, 
which had not, at that time, been sent to him (Sherman), 
thereby creating the impression that he had violated in- 
structions which he had never seen. The conduct of the 
Secretary of War in this instance was a departure from 
the usages of his department, and was a violation of that 
official courtesy due from one officer to another, and it was 
this conduct that caused Sherman to complain. He never 
has complained of its rejection ; but, its publication, with 
Mr. Stanton's reasons and the sensational dispatches in- 
sinuating that he had been bribed to let Jeffi Davis escape, 
which emanated from the War Department, he considered 
an attempt to insult and destroy him. 

So far as the public is concerned, they have a right to 
discuss the provisions of the agreement in a far different 
spirit; to them the question is, whether or not the plan 
proposed in it (with the proper modifications) would have 
proved more satisfactory and less expensive than the plan 
which has been adopted. I do not wish to discuss this 
question in this connection further than to observe that the 
agreement contemplated a return to the ante-hellmn condition 
by the States forming the Confederacy, and that the terms 
of reconstruction should be agreed to by each of those 
States respectively with the United States. This plan 
would have been a simpler method than the one that has 
been pursued, and would probably have prevented much of 
the fraud incident to the destruction of State governments. 

There is one reason given by Mr. Stanton for rejecting 
the agreement that is remarkable, and especial attention is 
invited to it. In the order in which the reasons are printed, 
it appears as the eighth. It is as follows : 

"Eighth. It (the agreement) gave terms that had been deliberately, 
repeatedly, and solemnly rejected by President Lincoln, and better terms 
than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous condition." Ke- 
view, p. 233. 

The statements here made are extraordinary. The 
agreement provided in substance for the disbanding of the 



THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 65 

Confederate armies, and that each officer and man should 
cease from acts of war and abide by the action of the 
Federal authorities, the re-establishment of Federal courts, 
the cessation of the war, a general amnesty, and the re- 
sumption of peaceful pursuits. In effect, the rebels were 
to disband, lay down their arms, return home, and obey the 
laws. The most prosperous condition of the rebels was 
early in 1863. If the statement made in Mr. Stanton's eighth 
reason be true, we continued the war for nearly two years 
after the rebels oflered to disband their armies and cease 
all resistance to the laws, and to submit to the Federal 
authority. 

The last two years of the war cost more than half of 
all the war debt, with a corresponding loss of life, and dur- 
ing that time it appears from this statement that the rebels 
repeatedly offered to submit to the laws and give up the 
contest, and that these terms were rejected. 

It becomes important to know for what reason the war 
was continued two years after all resistance to the consti- 
tution and the laws was offered to be discontinued. The 
excitement was so great at the time this statement was 
made, that no notice was taken of it, but the time has now 
arrived when an inquiry can be properly and safely made, 
and it would not be amiss to have the subject investigated, 
with a view to have history correctly written. It was 
claimed at the beginning of the war, and during its exist- 
ence, that the sole purpose for which it was prosecuted w^as 
to overcome the armed resistance to the laws and to main- 
tain the integrity of the Union. E'o other purpose has 
ever been avowed by the government, or understood by the 
people. In view of this fact, this declaration by the Sec- 
retary of War becomes important and remarkable. It 
would be well if the reviewer would continue his researches 
among the records of the War Department, with a view of 
ascertaining the particulars of such offers made by the 
rebels. When the documents upon which this declaration 
is based are published, they may change public opinion as 
to the real objects of the war. 

In view of this statement (i. e. the eighth reason) the 



66 THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 

war office records may also throw new light upon the 
action of the Department in rejecting the agreement. 
Admiral Porter has related a conversation which took 
place between President Lincoln, Sherman, Grant, and 
himself, on board the flag-ship " Queen," at City Point, 
March 27, 1865. 

This conversation is given at p. 328 et seq., vol. 2 of 
the Memoirs, and it is an exceedingly interesting document 
taken in connection with the events which followed it, and 
especially with reference to the agreement. He there says 
that Sherman insisted that he could command his own 
terms from Johnston, but that the President insisted that 
the surrender of Johnston's army must be obtained upon 
any terms, and that Sherman yielded to the President's 
views. 

It seems very strange that the President shonld have 
been so desirous of obtaining Johnston's surrender upon 
*' any terms," if he had repeatedly and solemnly rejected bet- 
ter terms than a disbanding of the rebel army and a sub- 
mission to the laws under Federal authority. Considerable 
stress, in this connection, has been laid upon the dispatch 
to G-rant, of March 3, 1865, limiting his (Grant's) powers 
to matters purely military, and prohibiting the discussion 
of civil matters with the rebels. This was doubtless proper, 
and should have been communicated to Sherman, if it was 
expected to limit and guide his conduct ; but it was not 
communicated to him until after the Johnston agreement 
was submitted to the Secretary of War. 

On the contrary, he had the President's views as ex- 
pressed to him on the 27th of March, as above stated, 
and he had observed that the commanding officer at Rich- 
mond had approved the call for convening the legisla- 
ture of Virginia, and he had Secretary Stanton's direc- 
tion, when at Savannah, to take charge of all matters, 
civil and military. These facts and circumstances, combined 
with the oft-repeated declarations that the war was prose- 
cuted for the sole purpose of restoring Federal authority, 
were sufficient to lead him to think that an agreement 
which embodied a submission to the constitution and the 



THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 67 

laws was at least worthy of being considered. Least of all 
did he suppose that he would be denounced as a traitor for 
transmitting it to the authorities at Washington ! 

Ten years have elapsed since the war closed, and we 
now know that all the terms ofl'ered to Johnston have been 
in substance agreed to, with the exception of the stipulation 
relating to a recognition of the rebel State governments. 

Whether the course which has been adopted is better 
than it would have been to recognize those in existence at 
the close of the rebellion, is a question which time and 
future events will probably answer. 



The following is the Confederate general Johnston's 
account of the interviews : 

"In the morning of the 16th (April), when the army was within a 
few miles of Greenboro, a reply to the letter of the 13th was received 
from General Sherman, signifying his assent to the proposal that we 
should meet for conference in relation to an armistice. Supposing that 
the President (Davis) was waiting in Greensboro to open negotiations, 
should the armistice be agreed upon, I hastened there to show General 
Sherman's reply, and to receive any instructions he might have to give. 
He had quitted the town, however, and was on the way to Charlotte. 

"Having requested Lieutenant-General Hampton, by telegraph, to 
arrange the time and place of meeting, I went to his headquarters, two or 
three miles southeast of Hillsboro. There General Hampton informed me 
that the conference was to be at noon next day, at a house on the Kaleigh 
road, midway between the pickets of the two armies. 

" General Sherman met me at the time and place appointed, the house 
being that of a Mr. Bennett. As soon as we were without witnesses in 
the room assigned to us, General Sherman showed me a telegram from 
Mr. Stanton, announcing the assassination of the President of the United 
States. . . . 

""When General Sherman understood what seemed to have escaped 
him in reading my letter, that my object was to make such an armistice as 
would give opportunity for negotiation between the 'civil authorities' of 
the two countries, he said that such negotiations were impossible, because 
the government of the United States did not acknowledge the existence 
of a Southern Confederacy, nor, consequently, its civil authorities as such ; 
therefore, he could not receive, for transmission any proposition addressed 
to the government of the United States by those claiming to be the civil 
authorities of a Southern Confederacy. He added, in a manner that car- 
ried conviction of sincerity, expressions of a wish to divert from the South 
such devastation as the continuance of the war would make inevitable ; 



68 THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 

and, as a means of accomplishing that object, so far as the armies we com- 
manded were concerned, he offered me such terms as those given to Gen- 
eral Lee. 

" I replied that our relative positions were too different from those of 
the armies in Virginia to justify me in such a capitulation, but suggested 
that we might do more than he proposed: that, instead of a partial sus- 
pension of hostilities, we might, as other generals had done, arrange the 
terms of a permanent peace. . . . We then entered into a discussion 
of the terms that might be given to the Southern States on their submis- 
sion to the authority of the United States. General Sherman seemed to 
regard the resolutions of Congress and the declaration of the President of 
the United States as conclusive, that the restoration of the Union was the 
object of the war, and to believe that the soldiers of the United States had 
been fighting for that object. A long official conversation with Mr. Lin- 
coln, on Southern affairs, a very short time before, had convinced him that 
the President then adhered to that view. 

"/m the course of the ajiernoon we agreed upon the terms expressed in 
the memorandum drawn up on the I8th, except that General Sherman did 
not consent to include Mr. Davis and the officers of his cabinet in an oth- 
erwise general amnesty. Much of the afternoon was consumed in endeav- 
ors to dispose of this part of the question in a manner that would be satis- 
factory both to the government of the United States and the Southern 
people, as well as to the Confederate President ; but at sunset no conclusion 
had been reached, and the conference was suspended, to be resumed at ten 
o'clock next morning. Thinking it probable that the confidential relations 
of the Secretary of War with Mr. Davis might enable him to remove the 
only obstacle to an adjustment, I requested him by telegraph to join me as 
soon as possible. 

"General Breckinridge and Mr. Keagan came to General Hampton's 
quarters together, an hour or two before daybreak. After they had re- 
ceived from me as full an account of the discussion of the day before as 
my memory enabled me to give, and had learned the terms agreed upo7i, 
and the difficulty in the way of full agreement, Mr. Keagan proposed to 
reduce them to writing, to facilitate reconsideration. In doing so, he in- 
cluded the article for amnesty without exceptions, the only one not fully 
agreed to. This paper, being unfinished when General Breckinridge and 
myself set out to the place of meeting, was to be sent to me there. 

"When we met, I proposed to General Sherman that General Breck- 
inridge should be admitted to our discussions, as his personal relations with 
the President of the Confederacy might enable him to remove the obstacle 
to agreement that we had encountered the day before. He assented, and 
that gentleman joined us. 

" We had conversed on the subject discussed the day before perhaps a 
half hour, when the memorandum written by Mr. Reagan was brought. 
I read this paper to General Sherman, as a basis for terms of peace, point- 
ing out to him that it contained nothing which he had not already accepted, 
but the language that included the president and the cabinet in the terms of 
amnesty. After listening to General Breckinridge, who addressed him six 



THE REJECTED AGREEMENT. 69 

or eight minutes in advocacy of these conditions of peace, General Sher- 
man wrote very rapidly the memorandum that follows, with the papers 
presented by me before him. He wrote so rapidly that I thought, at the 
time, that he must have come to the place prepared to agree to amnesty, 
with no exceptions. His paper diflfered from mine only in being fuller." 
Johnston's Narrative, p. 401-405, 



CHAPTER XIX. 

THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 

" General Sherman, in his last chapter, discusses at considerable length 
the same issues which he raised with the Secretary of War and the statute 
law, when he assumed the duties of general, assigning all the oflBcials in 
the "War Department, except the secretary himself, and possibly his chief 
clerk, to duty upon his staff." (Keview, p. 259.) 

The foregoing paragraph commences a chapter devoted 
to a discussion of tlae law and ethics of army administra- 
tion in general, and the conduct of General Sherman in 
particular, at or about the time he was assigned to the com- 
mand of the army. Further along, at page 270, he charges 
Sherman in substance with insubordination, because he 
stated that he agreed with a report made by the military 
committee of the House, relating to the control of the staff 
department officers, adding that he, Sherman, would carry 
out such views as far as be had power. And this, says the 
reviewer, " was in a formal report after he had been ordered 
by the President not to carry out these identical views." 
(Review, p. 271.) 

In another paragraph, the reviewer charges General 
Sherman with " boldly invading the President's official 
household by attaching the chief of staff there, to report to 
him at the headquarters of the army." (Id. 267.) 

Here are three distinct charges or specifications : 

1. Violation of law. 

2. Insubordination. 

3. Official discourtesy toward the President. 

To sustain these charges the reviewer produces — 

1. General Order No. 11, March 8, 1869. (Review, 
263.) 

2. General Order No. 12, of the same date. (Id. 264.) 

3. General Order No. 28, March 27, 1869. (Id. 265.) 
These documents are followed by a number of citations 

(70) 



THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 71 

for the purpose of illustrating the laws governing the army, 
which will be noticed as we proceed. 

As to Order No. 11/ it is a publication of the Presi- 
dent's order of March 5th (three days preceding), and con- 
tains nothing else on its face. It states that it is issued "by 
direction of the President," and Sherman does not appear 
to have had anything to do with it — indeed, he could not 
have had anything officially to do with it, because it was 
issued by the President three days before Sherman assumed 
command of the army as general. 

Paragraph 2 of that order directs — 

" That the chiefs of staff corps, department, and bureaus will report 
to and act under the immediate orders of the general commanding the 
army." 

The next paragraph provides that all official business 
which, by law or regulations, requires the action of the 
President or Secretary of War, will be submitted by the 
general of the army to the Secretary of War. (Review, 
pp. 263, 264.) 

The reader's attention is invited to the fact that Sher- 
man found this order in force when he assumed command 

' [General Order No. 11.] 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ArMY, ADJUTANT GeNERAL'S OfFICE, "> 

Washington, March 8, 1869. / 
The following orders of the President of the United States are pub- 
lished for the information and government of all concerned : 

War Department, "i 
Washington City, March 5, 1869. j 

By direction of the President, General William T. Sherman will as- 
sume command of the Army of the United States. 

The chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus will report to and 
act under the immediate orders of the general commanding the army. 
All official business, which by law or regulations requires the action of the 
President or the Secretary of War, will be submitted by the General of 
the Army to the Secretary of War; and, in general, all orders from the 
President or Secretary of War to any portion of the army line or staff 
will be trausmitted through the General of the Army. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, 

Secretary of War. 
By command of the General of the Army. 

E. D. TOWNSEND, 

Assistant Adjutant-General. 



72 THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 

, • 

of the array on the 8th of March, it being dated three days 
prior to that event ; and further, that by its terms, the 
chiefs of stafl' departments are ordered to report to him, 
and that among these officers is the " adjutant-general," 
the " chief stafi" officer of the President's official house- 
hold," alluded to by the reviewer at page 267. 

Attention is also invited to Sherman's order No, 12, 
pages 264, 265 (March 8), in which he assigns these staff 
officers to duty upon the general staff. From this ex- 
amination it will appear that, in assigning these officers to 
duty, he was obeying the order of the President. 

This examination will show also that if the laws were 
violated by the order, it was the President who violated them 
in the first instance, and not General Sherman. Thus, the 
charge against Sherman amounts to nothing from this 
evidence. Again, it also disposes of the charge " of boldly 
invading the President's official household," because the 
order on its face shows that the officer referred to (the 
adjutant-general) was directed by the President to report 
to General Sherman. 

It will be seen that Order j^o. 12 is precise in its terms. 
It attempts to do nothing more than to execute the Presi- 
dent's order, which Sherman was bound to obey. The inti- 
mation of official discourtesy toward the President there- 
fore disappears with the charge of violating the statute 
law. There is, however, one view to be taken of this 
matter which should not be overlooked. At page 263, the 
reviewer says, in substance, that one of Sherman's first 
official acts was to issue an order reducing the Secretary of 
War to tlie position of a mere clerk, and that for this pur- 
pose, he obtained a preliminary order from the President. 
He then furnishes a copy of the Order No. 11 (above refer- 
red to). It might be deemed a complete answer to this 
assertion to call attention to its date, which, as already ob- 
served, is three days prior to Sherman's assuming com- 
mand of the army ; but I do not wish to answer the charge 
in this way, lest the impression might be thereb}" left that 
Sherman obtained the order before assuming command for 
some purpose of his own. 



THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 73 



The reviewer pays a poor compliment to the President 
as well as to General Schofield (then Secretary of War), 
when he says that they allowed Sherman to obtain this 
order, stating, as he does, that the attention of the latter 
was directed to the fact that it violated " twenty-six sec- 
tions of statute law or regulations," and that he (Schofield) 
contented himself with pointing out this fact, as he was 
about to retire from his position. One would suppose that 
General Schofield, in whose name this violation of law was 
committed, would have done something more than to point 
out the fact, " being contented " with so doing. 

It would have been well if the reviewer had produced 
some better evidence of this statement relating to General 
Schofield's action in this connection, than his own assertion. 
No officer is bound to issue or obey an order which he 
knows violates the law ; hence, if General Schofield issued 
this order under the direction of the President, knowing it 
to be a violation of the law, he was guilty of a grave oflense. 
General Schofield's rank and reputation were such as to 
forbid the belief that he would do what is here charged, 
and the public have an interest in knowing whether or not 
the charge is true ; the reviewer ought to produce the proof 
of it. General Schofield's reputation leads me to doubt the 
assertion, and as the records are open to the reviewer, I 
trust he will confirm his statement, if there is any proof 
which will sustain him. 

"We will return to the charge or intimation that Sher- 
man obtained the order from Grant to enable him to re- 
duce the Secretary of War to " the position of a mere 
clerk." The reviewer furnishes no proof that Sherman ob- 
tained this order, or that it was issued at his request; and 
the statement, therefore, is not supported by any records, 
official or otherwise. 

I will, however, endeavor to explain this matter in the 
light of public history, which is tolerably well known to 
all who have taken any interest in our military affairs. A 
controversy as old as the government has existed between 
the line and the staff of the army, relating to the methods 
of military administration and government. This con- 



74 THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 

troversy is important in many ways. It relates to the mode 
of command and government in the army, together with 
the relations that different branches of the service bear to 
each other. Without entering largely into the merits of 
this controversy in this connection, it is sufficient to observe 
that Grant and Sherman agreed substantially to the prop- 
osition that the staff officers should (with certain excep- 
tions) be under the immediate control of the general-in- 
chief. The necessity of this, so far as the adjutant-general 
is concerned, was more apparent and pressing than as to 
the other officers referred to. 

After the war was over, and General Grant removed 
his headquarters to "Washington, he was more than ever 
impressed with the necessity of a change in the methods of 
transacting the business, relating to reports, orders, etc. 
He at once undertook the duty of making the necessary 
correction. With that purpose in view, he addressed to 
Secretary Stanton the following letter, which explains 
itself: 

Washington, January 29, 1866. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

From the period of the difficulties between Major-General (now 
Lieutenant-General) Scott with Secretary Marcy, during the administra- 
tion of President Polk, the command of the army virtually passed into 
the hands of the Secretary of War. 

From that day to the breaking out of the rebellion, the general-in- 
chief never kept his headquarters in Washington, and could not conse- 
quently, -with propriety, resume "his proper functions. To administer the 
affairs of the army properly, headquarters and the adjutant-general's office 
must be in the same place. 

During the war, whilst in the field, my functions as commander of all 
the armies was never impaired, but were facilitated in all essential matters 
by the administration and by the War Department. Now, however, that 
the war is over, and I have brought my headquarters to this city, I find 
my position embarrassing, and I think out of place. 

I have been intending, or did intend, to make the beginning of the 
New Year the time to bring this matter before you, with a view of asking 
to have the old condition of affairs restored, but, from diffidence about 
mentioning the matter, have postponed it until now. 

In a few words, I will state what I conceive to be my duties and my 
place, and ask respectfully to be restored to them and it. 

The entire adjutant-general's office should be under the entire control 
of the general-in-chief of the army. No orders should go to the army, or 
the adjutant-general, except through the general-in-chief. 



THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 75 

Such as require the action of the President would be laid before the 
Secretary of War, whose actions would be regarded as those of the Presi- 
dent. In short, in my opinion, the general-in-chief stands between the 
President and the army in all official matters, and the Secretary of War 
is between the army (through the general-in-chief) and the President. 

I am very well convinced that a rule, so long disregarded, could not 
or would not be restored without the subject being presented, and I now 
do so, respectfully, for your consideration. 

(Signed,) U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant-General. 

The difficulties which the Secretary of War had with 
President Johnson, are supposed to have prevented any 
action upon the request made in this communication. At 
all events, nothing definite came of it at that time. It is 
reproduced for the purpose of showing that General Grant, 
as far back as 1866, entertained well-defined views as to 
the duties of the " chief officer of the staff department" — viz., 
the adjutant-general; and the terms in which he expresses 
himself in this letter are almost identical with the terms 
of Order No. 11, above referred to. It is true, that in 
the order he directs all the chiefs of staff departments to 
report to and be under the immediate control of the gen- 
eral of the army, while in the letter he speaks only of the 
adjutant-general. The fact that the order is more com- 
prehensive than the letter, shows that his experience at 
Washington had enlarged his views as to the necessity for 
a change in the forms of the rendition of reports, etc. 

This letter and the order, taken in connection with the 
relation of the parties to them, conclusively contradict the 
statement of the reviewer, that Sherman obtained the order 
from Grant ; on the contrary, they establish the fact that 
the change sought to be brought about was the result of 
Grant's own reflection. Sherman doubtless agreed with 
him in relation to this matter, and it is probable that most 
of our officers who have seen and felt the evils of the present 
methods, also agreed with them. It is further well known 
that General Grant stated at Chicago, in December after 
his election, but before his inauguration, that as soon as he 
was inaugurated he would issue the orders necessary to 
bring about the desired changes, and that Order No. 11 was 



76 THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 

then in substance agreed upon. It has been shown that 
the order was issued the day after he became President — 
almost his first official act as commander-in-chief. In view 
of the facts appearing upon the face of the orders, and the 
history of the controversy referred to, the conduct of the re- 
viewer in attacking General Sherman discloses a spirit 
which tends to utterly destroy the value of his judgment. 

In view of the facts, however, that Grant and Sherman 
both agreed to the propriety of the orders referred to, it 
may be well to push the inquiry a step further to ascertain 
whether or not the reviewer is correct in his statement 
that the orders violate the law. If this should turn out 
to be the fact, whatever responsibility there is connected 
with it falls primarily upon the President and Secretary of 
War, and secondarily only upon Sherman, who is not 
shown to have been aware of any such violation. 

It is, however, believed that the learned reviewer's 
legal conclusions touching this matter are erroneous. 

His statement, on page 265, is that " General Rawlins 
called the attention of the President to the various violations 
of law involved in Sherman's order." "These," it is said, 
"were too plain to admit either of doubt or extended dis- 
cussion." "Whereupon, the order of March 27, rescinding 
the previous order, was issued by the President, 

The looseness with which these statements are thrown 
together is evidence, either of great carelessness on the 
part of the reviewer, or of an intention to deceive his 
readers. His assertions are that the President's attention 
was called to the violations of law, in Sherman's order, and 
" that the President issued an order revoking those above." 
It is shown on the face of the " revoking order," that the 
President is revoking his own order (No. 11), and says 
nothing at all about Sherman's order (No. 12). This at- 
tempt at petty deception would not be noticed if it were 
not rfor the fact that it is so artfully arranged by the re- 
viewer as to mislead the reader unless especial attention is 
directed to it. Order No. 11 is, it is true, published in the 
current series of army orders for that year, but it contained 
absolutely nothing relating to command, except the Presi- 



THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 77 

dent's order of March 5th. It was au order directed to 
General Sherman, and through him to the army. 

The attempt, therefore, that is here made by the re- 
viewer to mislead and deceive the reader, by indicating 
that it is Sherman's order that is obnoxious instead of the 
President's, is enough to destroy whatever may be left of 
belief in his good faith or integrity of purpose. 

Passing, however, from this, we will endeavor to ascer- 
tain whether he does show that the violations of law were 
" too plain to admit of either doubt or extended discussion." 
The theory of the reviewer's reasoning appears to be that 
the staff officers referred to were required by law and reg- 
ulations to report directly to the Secretary of War, and 
therefore the direction requiring them to report to the 
commanding general violated such "law and regulations." 
If the orders referred to and the authorities cited are com- 
pared when applied to the facts to which they relate, it 
will be seen that they do not sustain the learned re- 
viewer's conclusions. It is not disputed that both the Pres- 
ident and Secretary of War are charged by law severally 
with certain duties which they must personally discharge. 
It is not necessary here to enumerate those duties ; they 
are numerous and important, and can be readily ascer- 
tained by a reference to the acts of Congress. It is not 
claimed, that I am aware of, by any one, that when the law 
requires the President or Secretary personally to discharge 
a specific duty, its performance can be delegated to others. 

It will be seen by referring to Orders Nos. 11 and 12 that 
they provide for this very exigency. The substance of the 
provisions in both orders is, that such official business as re- 
quires the action of the President or Secretary of War 
shall be laid before the Secretary of War by the general of 
the army. (Review, p. 264.) 

From this, it appears that the general was to report 
to the Secretary of War all official business requiring 
his attention or that of the President. So that if this was 
not satisfactory to the Secretary of War, it raises the 
inference that he required official business to be submit- 
ted to him that he was not bylaw required to act upon. It 



THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 



does not look very much like subordinating him to the po- 
sition of clerk to require the commanding officer of the 
army to report to him. 

It is difficult to determine what the reviewer means by 
the statements made in connection w^ith this matter. I 
have shown : 1. That the order was issued by the President 
through the Secretary of War before Sherman was in 
command ; 2. That the President had long entertained the 
views expressed in the order ; 3. That all official business 
which requires his action, or that of the Secretary of War, 
should, in effect, be excepted from its operation ; and finally, 
that the order was repealed within three weeks after its 
issue, without any protest being shown upon the part of 
General Sherman. The authorities cited by the reviewer 
tend merely to establish the following points : 

1. That the orders issued by the Secretary of War to the 
army are to be presumed to be the President's orders. A 
proposition which no one denies. 

2. That there are a number of statutes and regulations 
placing the chief officers of certain staff departments under 
the direction and control of the Secretary of War. 

This proposition is also undisputed so far as I know. 
That this language, however, does not mean immediately 
under the secretary is apparent from the terms of other 
sections, which use the term " immediate " where it is in- 
tended to place the officers in that relation to him. (See 
sec. 220, p. 35, Kevised Statutes.) 

It is perhaps also true that a large number of these re- 
ports, etc., require the special action of the President or 
secretary. If they do, they are within the exception 
of the order which directs them to be submitted to the 
secretary, so that there is not even the pretense of an ex- 
cuse left for the reviewer's assertion that the order contra- 
vened the law. 

This subject being disposed of, attention is called to the 
charge of insubordination made by the reviewer against 
Sherman. The specification is that he stated to the mili- 
tary committee of the House that, as far as he had author- 
ity, he would carry out the views expressed by the commit- 



THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 79 

tee (to the effect that the staff officers onglit to be subor- 
dinated to the command of the general-in-cliief the same 
as other officers of the army). The reviewer says that 
Sherman used this language after he had been expressly 
ordered by the President not to carry out " these iden- 
tical views." Thus, by inference at least, charging him with 
insubordination. The confident manner of making this as- 
sertion is such as to lead the unsuspecting reader to pre- 
sume at least that it rested upon some sort of foundation, 
and yet a moment's examination shows that it rests upon 
nothing at all. 

The statement of Sherman is made in a report while he 
(Sherman) was acting as Secretary of War after the death of 
General Rawlins, and several months after the order re- 
scinding Order 'No. 11 had been issued. 

To prove that Sherman had been "expressly ordered" 
not to carry out the views which he expressed, the re- 
viewer produces a paragraph of an existing order, in wdiich 
it is directed by the President that official business requir- 
ing his attention or that of the Secretary of War should be 
submitted to the Secretary of War by the chiefs of the 
staff departments. From this order it appears that the 
business referred to was to be submitted to the Secretary of 
War by the officers named, instead of by the general of the 
army. One of two things is true — either General Sherman 
had authority to control those officers, or he had not. If 
he had authority to control them, it was his duty to exer- 
cise that authority in accordance with his judgment. If, 
however, there was doubt about his authority, then his re- 
ply is to be construed as merely stating that he would carry 
out the views of the committee as far as he had authority. 

The reviewer misstates the fact when he says in this 
connection " that the President had expressly ordered 
Sherman not to carry out these identical views." No such 
order is shown, and there is no authority for this statement, 
except the paragraph at page 270 (above referred to). Tliat 
direction is an order to otiier officers as to the discharge of 
their duties, and does not expressly refer to General Sher- 
man at all. To make such an assertion, as the reviewer 



80 THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 

here makes upon snch authority as he adduces is an abuse 
of language, which can be accounted for upon no hypoth- 
esis consistent with fair deahng and honesty of intention. 

At page 263, the reviewer says : " That the removal 
of army headquarters to St. Louis resulted in a great de- 
gree from the fact that he (Sherman) could not bring him- 
self to conform to this law." The reviewer again becomes 
confusing in his propositions. If this paragraph has any 
meaning at all, it is that Sherman would not be compelled 
"to conform to law" if headquarters were in St. Louis in- 
stead of Washington. This is a discovery which the re- 
viewer ought not to be deprived of, and I shall not attempt 
to discuss it with him. If an officer can escape " conforming 
to the law" by removing to St. Louis, it will be well to 
have the fact generally understood, and I leave to the 
learned reviewer the pleasure of establishing the proposi- 
tion he apparently puts forth. 

The reviewer does not give any authority for the as- 
sertion that General Sherman removed his headquarters to 
St. Louis because he could not bring himself to conform to 
law, and after the exhibition of hostility which he has 
evinced in his book, it is hardly safe to accept his state- 
ments upon any topic where General Sherman is con- 
cerned. 

Inasmuch as five years or more elapsed after the order 
in controversy was issued before headquarters were re- 
moved, the presumption would appear to contradict the 
assertion. 

It is much more probable that the removal to St. 
Louis was efiected after all due consideration was given to 
the subject, and that it was decided to be for the benefit of 
the service. Snch a removal could only take place with 
the consent and approval of the President; and such ap- 
proval by him ought to raise a presumption that it was 
done for the benefit of the army. This at least ought to 
be the conclusion until the contrary appears. The attempt, 
therefore, by the reviewer to make it appear that the re- 
moval in any way grew out of a disposition approaching 
insubordination is unsupported by any evidence. 



THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 81 

There is one allegation which ought not to pass unno- 
ticed. At page 266, Sherman is charged with violation of 
law in attaching ten officers to the general stafi' and six to 
his personal stafi" — sixteen in all — while the act of Congress 
only provided for six aids-de-camp. This charge is a mere 
play upon the meaning of words. The six aids mentioned in 
the act referred to, are to be assigned to duty upon his per- 
sonal staff". No mention is made or limitation provided 
for the number of officers upon the general staff". The 
statements of the reviewer referring to this matter are cal- 
culated to mislead the reader. 

It would seem that he did not understand the dis- 
tinction between what is termed the general staff" of the 
army and the aids which are attached to the personal staff 
of a commanding officer. 

Whether the reviewer understood this distinction or 
not, it is recognized throughout our military legislation and 
is perfectly well understood in practice, and the terms of the 
act giving the general-in-chief six aids-de-camp, are such 
as to show that the officers of the general staff were not 
referred to. 

The officers of the general staff above referred to being 
ordered to report to General Sherman by the President, 
were assigned to duty in accordance with their rank, each 
in his own staff" department, and that is all there is of this 
asserted violation of law. It became Sherman's .duty to 
assign them to their proper functions as soon as the Presi- 
dent's order became obligatory upon him. 

The reviewer says " that this did not diff"er in any ma- 
terial respect from what General Sheridan or any other 
general officer would be guilty of in issuing an order direct- 
ing staff' officers to report to him, who, by express provis- 
ion of law, had been placed under the general of the army." 

This illustration is incorrect, in this : General Sherman 
did not direct the staff officers referred to to report to him- 
self. What was done by him was to assign these officers to 
duty upon receipt of the President's order, which directed 
them to report to him. The illustration would be more 
nearly correct if General Sheridan, or any other general of- 



82 THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 

ficer, should assign officers of the general staff to duty after 
such officers were directed to report to him by the general 
of the army. 

Having thus shown that the charges made by the re- 
viewer against General Sherman in this chapter are with- 
out foundation, it may not be amiss to call attention to a 
few of the observations made in the Memoirs as to the mil- 
itary lessons of the war. 

The substance of the views upon this topic is, that good 
government of the army requires that it should be a unit 
for action ; that commanding officers should be hampered 
by forms just as little as possible, and that all portions of the 
army should be governed alike. That this is not the case 
in our army was fully demonstrated during the war, and is 
in substance stated by General Grant in his letter to Secre- 
tary Stanton. (Ante, p. 74.) An attempt was made to 
remedy this evil when he (Grant) became acting Secretary 
of War in 1867-8. 

It will be remembered that, pursuant to an act of Con- 
gress, a board of military officers was convened during that 
winter, consisting of Sherman, Sheridan, and Augur, who 
were directed to revise the regulations for the purpose of 
submitting them to Congress. A report was made, which 
was approved by General Grant and submitted to Congress. 
This report corrected, or attempted to do so, many of the 
evils which have long existed to the detriment of the ser- 
vice, growing out of the fact that the regulations do not 
clearly define the duties of the various officers who are 
charged with the performance of them. This evil can not 
be thoroughly corrected without a revision of the regula- 
tions by Congress. 

Another of the difficulties seems to be a lack of that 
unity so desirable in all business operations, which in the 
army become a necessity where promptness is required. 

The reviewer appears to be of the opinion that the 
adjutant-general is a staff officer to the Secretary of "War; at 
least one of the authorities he cites appears to be for the 



THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 83 

purpose of establishing that proposition. The practice at 
the War Department seems to justify that such is the view 
of the law at that office.^ 

The revised statutes provide in substance that military 
power shall be transmitted from one military officer to an- 
other, and there is no provision of law making the Secre- 
tary of War a military officer. Hence it would seem that 
he has no legal power to command such officers ; and yet it 
appears from General Grant's letter that the entire control 
of the army has passed into the hands of the Secretary of 
War. 

It seems from statements made in this connection that 
the secretary controls the army, and that without being 
himself under military control he manages to command it 
without the authority of law and without the responsibility 
which attaches to military rank in the army. 

Pending the controversy between President Johnson 
and Secretary Stanton, an attempt was made by the former 
to prevent orders being sent in his name to the army by 
the latter, and General Grant was directed by the Presi- 

II am induced to state this because the form of an order now before 
me (lately issued by the War Department), convening a general court- 
martial, seems to indicate that such is the view of the law, at the war 
oflSce. The theory seems to be this: That the President has power to con- 
vene a general court-martial; that therefore the Secretary of War can 
convene such a court; that, as he has power to convene the court, he may 
delegate that power to the adjutant-general. The order accordingly pro- 
ceeds in the usual form, directing the formation of the court ; at its conclu- 
sion it is signed by an officer of the adjutant-general's bureau, who states 
that it is issued " bj' order of the Secretary of AVar." The question as 
to the legality of the court at once presents itself. To determine this, the 
authority of the officer creating it must be ascertained. If he is not le- 
gally invested with that power, any one convicted by that court would be 
discharged. 

The President is not expressly authorized to convene such a court, ex- 
cept in certain contingencies (not shown to exist in the present order). 
Conceding, however, that he has an implied authority to do so (a proposi- 
tion not at all clear), an order issued by the Secretary would doubt- 
less be held to be the President's order, and therefore valid ; but it is be- 
lieved that the delegation of power could go no further. That while the 
Secretary may issue orders which are in law the President's, he can not 
delegate that power to an army officer, so as to empower liim to issue 
orders in the form above mentioned. 



84 THE LINE AND THE STAFF. 

dent not to obey orders issued at the war office without 
first ascertaining that they really were authorized by the 
President. This General Grant declined to do, alleging 
that the Secretary of War had stated to him that he (the 
Secretary) had received no orders of a similar import from 
the President; therefore it was to be presumed by him 
(Grant) that the orders from the War Department were 
the President's orders, although it was in fact known that 
such was not the case. 

Thus the President found himself unable to control 
the secretary in the exercise of powers vested in him (the 
President) by the constitution. These facts are referred 
to for the purpose of illustrating the necessity of revising 
the regulations governing the army and removing all 
doubts and uncertainty ; whereas, while such doubts and 
uncertainties remain, there will continue to be color at least 
for the opinion that the various bureaus of the War De- 
partment are absorbing all the functions of government 
and command of the army. Thus that jealousy of the army 
which impairs its usefulness will continue. It is difficult 
to understand why there should be any objection from any 
direction to defining the powers of all officers correctly ; 
and now that there is no war on hand nor anticipated, is the 
time to apply the remedy. 



CONCLUSION. 

The true value of such memoirs as those of General 
Sherman consists in the fact that they present events as 
they appeared to him at the time they occurred. This value 
is not essentially changed by the circumstance that his 
opinions thus given agree or disagree with our own. It 
is valuable for us to know how an officer looked upon 
events in which he was a prominent actor. 

This is true, even if we are confident that his opinions 
are erroneous. All we should expect, and what we have a 
right to demand, is that such memoirs should present pic- 
tures truthfully. We should not expect them to be so 
framed as to suit our preconceived views of the matters 
narrated, nor should we expect such narratives to be free 
from the tinge of personal feeling. They would not be 
likely to be truthful if they were clear of such shading. 

The personal allusions in Sherman's Memoirs may pos- 
sibly for a time create some feeling among those who are 
too much or too little noticed in them, but a little reflection 
will show that to have commented properly upon all the 
good deeds of his brother officers would have required 
more space than properly belonged to his task. Such no- 
tices many of his companions deserve; but to do full jus- 
tice to each, would require a volume in their behalf. 

In determining whether or not the Memoirs are un- 
duly tinged with personal feelings, they should be compared 
with other performances of a similar character, rather than 
with the narrations of events made long subsequent to their 
occurrence, and after the prominent actors are dead. The 
truth of history is difhcult to obtain at all times, and espe- 
cially so where the narration takes place a considerable 
period subsequent to the occurrences attempted to he related. 
In addition to this, it is apt to be the case that most his- 
tories are tinged with the personal or political views of the 
writer, or of the party to which he belonged. Without 
such explanations as arc to be found in personal narratives 

(85) 



86 CONCLUSION. 



or memoirs, it becomes next to impossible for us, of the 
present generation, to fully comprehend the historical nar- 
ratives of the preceding one. 

If General Sherman's Memoirs are compared with 
those of General Scott, published just previous to the lat- 
ter's death, it will be found that the latter are much 
more open to the charge of being personal than are those 
of Sherman ; so also of the memoirs of John Quincy 
Adams, lately edited by his son, Charles Francis Adams. 
These memoirs contain a free criticism upon the con- 
duct of most of the men with whom their distinguished 
author held personal or official relations. Had they been 
published in the lifetime of Mr. Adams, and of the par- 
ties referred to, it is probable that much complaint would 
have resulted. It is possible that here and there uninten- 
tional errors are to be found in the statements of Mr. Ad- 
ams. Even if this can be shown, it is not a solid argument 
against them. The truth they give far overbalances the 
minor errors that may be found. 

The memoirs of Kapoleon were published in London 
(1823, seven volumes). They were highly personal, con- 
taining numerous allusions of a very pointed character, re- 
lating to officers and others high in rank and popularity. 
This publication called forth a mass of complaining letters. 
In the subsequent editions of the work these letters were 
published, and thus a new element of value was added to 
the history of the events of that period. It is not too 
much to say that Napoleon's memoirs, with the letters which 
they brought forth, materially modified the views which 
the students of history had previously entertained concern- 
ing the events therein discussed. 

Should a second edition of Sherman's Memoirs be 
called for, it is to be hoped that he will pursue a similar 
course, and publish all the letters which have been written 
to him by officers and others, complaining that injustice has 
been done to them in the present edition. Such a course 
will present both views of the case to the public, and enable 
readers to draw their own conclusious. The history of 



CONCLUSION. 87 



Napoleon's memoirs illustrates how desirable it is to have 
such works published while the persons referred to are 
alive, and therefore able to state their own views of the 
events narrated. 



THE REVIEW 



General Sherman's Memoirs 



EXAMINED, 



CHIEFLY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OWN EVIDENCE. 



C. W. MOULTON, 

CINCINNATI, 0. 



CINCINNATI : 

ROBERT CLARKE & CO., PRINTERS, 

1875. 



PRICE 50 CENTS. 



